

201141

JPRS-NEA-84-084

24 May 1984

Near East/South Asia Report

19980302 024

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 21

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24 May 1984

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

CANAL PROJECT PLANNED--Tunis, 29 March (AFP). Tunisia and Algeria are studying a plan to create an inland sea by diverting water from the Mediterranean to a series of old lake beds, the Tunis government newspaper LA PRESSE said Thursday. A Tunisian-Algerian corporation has been created to study the project, the newspaper indicated. The idea of using a vast water project to bring water from a distance of about 500 kilometers to the desert expanses of the two countries along the 34th parallel is not new, said informed sources with regard to the plan. Its reappearance seems to have been made possible by the spectacular improvement in relations between Algeria and Tunisia since the beginning of 1983. In simple terms, a canal approximately 59 km long, passing through and connecting successive lake beds, would permit linking the Mediterranean north of Gabes, at the end of the gulf of the same name (about 400 km south of Tunis), to the edge of the first lake bed, Shott El Fedjadj. Then the Djerid and El Rharsa (actually less than 17 meters) and the vast Algerian Shott Maa Al-Harir between Tebessa and Touggourt would be filled with sea water and connected. According to prior indications, a port terminal could be created at the end of this last shott. Completion of the project, it was added, would permit modification of the climatic conditions of this vast desert region, its revitalization and the opening of new means of communication. [Text] [Paris AFP SAHARA in French No 680, 14 Apr 84 p 1] 8735

CSO: 4519/150

TURKISH STATE ACCUSED OF GENOCIDE BEFORE 'PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL'

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Apr 84 p 3

[Text] What good would it do to appeal to these 80 or more year old men, to call them to the witness stand so that they can again recount the horror they experienced when they were 10 years old? What good would it do, 69 years later, to demand admission of the crime and the injustice? Because, answered the People's Tribunal, meeting in Paris on 16 April, at the end of a session devoted to the genocide of Armenians: "the greater the injustice, the longer the facts have been hidden and the more intense is the aspiration for such an admission."

By grappling with this problem, the People's Tribunal, a moral authority by order of its composition,¹ which usually associates itself with more currently-urgent topics, wanted to make it clear that the Armenian question is not just an affair of the past and that it does not boil down to current terrorism either.

As long as the Turkish state does not recognize the reality of the crimes committed by a regime of which it is the successor, the denial of justice is perpetuated, a community is held up to ridicule in its dignity as a people, a community is deprived of what Gérard Chaliand, in the latest issue of the magazine ESPRIT, calls "the right to memory."²

The facts are known. But it is to the credit of this three-day session that it clarified them and backed them up, not only through the testimony of four survivors of the massacres, but also through the elements of proof brought by numerous historians.

Some massacres had already taken place--the one in 1894 which followed the insurrection in Sassoun (300,000 victims) and the one in Adana in 1909, most notably--but it is in 1915 that one must date the beginning of the genocide strictly speaking, that is, of massacres to which the witnesses before the Tribunal associated themselves to show the intentional and systematic character. "Beginning 24 April 1915," notes the Tribunal's final report, "according to a precise program, the government has been ordering the deportation of Armenians from the eastern vilayets. A special organization is created, it is constituted by common-law criminals, freed from prison, trained and equipped by the Union and Progress party."

The Defendant Was Absent

"Everything confirms the existence of a centralized command which controls the progress of the program (...). Deportation is in fact only a disguised form of extermination. At the outset, the most resistant are eliminated. Hunger, thirst and massacres decimate the convoys. Thousands of cadavers pile up on the roads. Trees and telephone poles are loaded down with hanged men; the rivers carry along the mutilated bodies which wash up along the river banks. Out of the 1,200,000 Armenians in the seven eastern vilayets, about 300,000 were able to make it back to the Caucasus, thanks to the Russian occupation, the others were killed on the spot or deported, the women and the children (about 200,000) were carried off. No more than 50,000 survivors reached Alep, the point at which the convoys of deportees converge."

Then there is the deportation of Armenians from Cicilia and Anatolia. "In total," the report says, "taking into account the refugees from Russia, one can estimate the number of survivors at 600,000, out of a population estimated in 1914, according to Arnold Toynbee, at 1,800,000."

Except for the Ottoman archives, which remain inaccessible, sources are numerous and have been thoroughly inventoried by Professor Hovannissian (United States), one of the members.³

The defendant, that is, the Turkish state, declined the invitation. Its arguments were not examined any less thoroughly, however, and were declared inadmissible. They focus first on the number: if the figures vary (the Armenian patriarchate, for example, estimates the community in 1914 at 2,100,000), the proportion of victims is always evaluated by the different sources at two-thirds of the community, and Turkish affirmations claiming that about 20 percent of the community is supposed to have been the victim "of the bad general conditions due to wartime" are not admissible. The Turkish government likewise uses as an excuse acts of sedition on the part of Armenians which, the Tribunal deems, cannot be compared to armed actions within the Ottoman Empire.

Finally, the Turkish authorities are trying to reverse the blame by putting forward a "genocide" against the Turks. The Tribunal recognized that some Turkish villages had been wiped out by Armenian troops in 1917, but "these acts, no matter how reprehensible they may be, could not be considered a genocide."

The Tribunal's sentence, then, was cut and dried: "The extermination of the Armenian populations constitutes an imprescriptible crime of genocide in the sense of the convention of 9 December 1948... It is also an international crime for which the Turkish state must assume responsibility without being able to offer discontinuity in that state as an excuse in order to extricate itself."

Of course, this judgment has only moral force. It will soon be presented to the UN subcommittee on the rights of man, but nothing says that this step will have any more success than previous ones. At least this demonstration had the

merit of insisting on "the responsibility of other states which, for geopolitical reasons, support the Turkish government." It probably also had the merit of showing before international opinion that the government of Ankara would gain in respectability by admitting facts for which it is not responsible.

For, as Professor Hovannissian said, "for a country, for its intellectuals, to be incapable of recognizing their history and repudiating it constitutes a real tragedy."

FOOTNOTES

1. The members of the jury were: Madjid Benchikh, professor at the University of Algiers; Georges Casalis (France), theologian; Harald Edelstam (Sweden), former ambassador; Richard Falk (United States), professor at Princeton University; Ken Fry (Australia), member of Parliament; Andrea Giardina (Italy), professor at the University of Rome; Sean MacBride (Ireland), president of the International Peace Office, Nobel Prize and Lenin Peace Prize; Leo Matarasso (France), lawyer in the Paris courts; Adolfo Perez Esquivel (Argentina), Nobel Peace Prize; James Petras (United States), professor at the State University (New York); François Rigaux (Belgium), professor at the Catholic University of Louvain; Ajit Roy (India), economist and journalist; George Wald (United States), Nobel Prize for Medicine, 1967.
2. ESPRIT (No 4), April 1984; see also the book by Gérard Chaliand and Yves Ternon: LE GENOCIDE DES ARMENIENS, Complexe editions.
3. Professor R. G. Hovannissian, THE ARMENIAN HOLOCAUST, Cambridge (Mass.), 1981.

9895

CSO: 4619/42

OPPOSITION JOURNAL ANALYZES CURRENT STATE OF ECONOMY

Casablanca AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI in Arabic 19, 20, 21 Apr 84

[19 Apr 84 p 5]

[Excerpts] Today, in the context of the fifth meeting organized by the Union Youth in Maamoura, we are publishing our brother Fathallah Lahlou's second presentation, in which he comments on the current economic situation in Morocco.

In this review, I will try to address myself to economic problems, proceeding from the premise of the current situation. However, rather than trying to repeat what is being said on this situation, I will approach it by understanding the economic, social and financial crisis, that is, the crisis in general.

Before doing so, I would like to say that we, as a progressive organization, being the popular current in which the aspirations of the struggling masses of the people stand out, and I could say the left in general, in advanced and third world countries both, are currently facing a new situation in the history of societies, developed and backward, which is part of what we might call the international system, because no country and no social and economic system today can realize any progress or regress except in the context of its position and the extent of its activities in the context of the transformations occurring in the international field.

The Three Challenges

Therefore, in general, since this new situation has become profoundly conspicuous in the eighties, we can say that social structures are now being subject to ways of thinking -- the thinking of the nation state, that is, national bodies with all their contradictions, resources and weak points, and the thinking of the international system -- and this affects countries and political forces, on the right or left, proceeding from this. The Moroccan left, the Arab left, and the left in the third world, as well as the left in the advanced countries, I believe, faces three challenges today:

The first challenge is the confrontation with what could be called the economic crisis. What concerns me is not the growing signs of this crisis but the effect of the crisis on activities and on our analysis of conditions, resources and powers, the determination of weak points, and the analysis of what we might call a national balance.

The second challenge is the democratic challenge. It has become apparent now, not just through theoretical analysis but through a reading of the history of third world countries which became independent after World War Two, especially since the end of the fifties, through the practices of the regimes we have been especially linked with, such as the nationalist and progressive Arab regimes, through what is happening in the Arab world and the deterioration this world is going through, and through the experience of Latin America, that democracy is the only way to make the peoples of the third world bear their responsibilities and face the internal challenges, which are represented by reaction in all its forms, and all forms of depredation, and the foreign challenges, represented by imperialism in all its forms and types.

Therefore a second challenge exists, the crisis of democracy, and the need to confront this crisis and overcome it. The problem with the matter is that it was possible at some time in the history of peoples to confront the issue of democracy without confronting the social and economic issue, but the challenge which exists now, which could have a historic effect, is that of trying to cope with the crisis and its effect on masses and organizations and at the same time to solve the problem of democracy.

The third challenge basically concerns the backward countries. It may be attributed to the legacies of colonialism in general, that is, the problem of recognizing one's identity, or the problem of territorial independence. We find this challenge in all Arab countries. They all are faced with the problem of Palestine. All Arab and African countries are going through a problem which we could call the problem of the definition of identity.

We in Morocco are experiencing these challenges very profoundly, proceeding from the three vital issues in our country, which are connected to the activities of the federation at the present time, its options, its policies, and its scope for development:

The challenge of confronting the crisis of democracy.

The challenge of confronting the economic and social situation.

The challenge of what is known as the issue of the Sahara.

Thus, proceeding from this, we come up with the liberation of territory and the liberation of man, politically and economically.

A Comprehensive Crisis

Proceeding from these three challenges, it would be a gross error to say that the crisis is just social, economic and financial. The crisis is

comprehensive in nature, and its solution can be realized only in comprehensive form. It is political, economic, social and of course societal in nature. It is comprehensive in nature also because it is connected to structures and contradictions within the national entity, by which I mean Morocco, the Maghreb and the Arab world. However, it is connected to something else, which is the evolution of the international situation, with all its contradictions as well.

It is a comprehensive crisis but we ourselves must not commit gross errors, either, in proceeding from the word "comprehensive," by belittling some aspects, including the economic, social and financial ones.

Defining the Crisis

Without entering into interpretations of a philosophical nature, I will try to explain what I mean by crisis. The crisis in general is linked to a sort of contraction, that is, a kind of contraction and decline, in incomes, buying power, consumption and investment. This means that what primarily concerns us is the nature of the decline and contraction. For perhaps 20 years or more we have been saying in our literature (the literature of the union) that Morocco has been going through an economic crisis since 1960, and in many cases it has been said, and is being said, that we have exaggerated the problems of the crisis. We have considered that that, perhaps, will lead to the solution of the problems, and we have given it great attention. In fact we must say that since independence Morocco has known a crisis of contraction and decline of such depth only since 1977. I will explain why.

Let us move on from economic strategy, which we can summarize in one point, which is that French colonialism came into our society and caused our economy and consequently the social structure to be linked, in a subordinate fashion, to the international economy, especially the metropolitan French and European economy. After independence, proceeding from the confrontation whose beginnings I experienced, the national balance shifted in favor of the right and consequently in favor of the powers which supported the liberal, alienated, subservient option, which was that of linkage to the international market.

We can now see the definition of the crisis. In the sixties, that is, approximately from 1960 to 1972, we observe that domestic income and domestic product, that is, what is produced by domestic resources and distributed among citizens, did not realize great progress; rather, its level remained low. Nonetheless, we cannot link what happened in the sixties to the notion of crisis. That means that a great contraction did not occur in production. Our production was that of a backward country which did not experience great decline. Although domestic income did not increase, the level of domestic income increased approximately by 2.5 percent while the population increased at a rate of 3 percent. However, in spite of that, a great decline did not occur in the sixties. What happened is that we fell behind, proceeding from the contradiction in investments in the sixties, and lagged in carrying out many economic, investment, infrastructure and educational projects.

Many of the problems Morocco faced in the seventies and eighties result from the circumstances of the lag in the sixties. Why the lag? Because the basic concern of the forces which were politically dominant in Morocco in the sixties was to amass power. The time for economic activity and even the issue of the Sahara was to come later; the amassing of power required basically a confrontation with the Socialist Union. Nonetheless, no decline occurred, for two reasons:

The first reason is international: The capitalist world in the sixties realized constant growth, and, proceeding from that growth, opened up its markets for our goods to us in spite of everything, and therefore the liberal, subservient, dependent Moroccan economy was provided with a form of oxygen. In the sixties we sold our citrus, early season produce and fish without great difficulty. Phosphate was of course in a critical situation, but it was not in a state of decline. In the sixties the migration of manpower in the international context in general started, and that gave oxygen of a sort to the Moroccan economy.

The Shift in Wealth

The second reason why it is not possible to give what happened in the sixties the definition of crisis is that the Moroccan economy -- and this is a basic point which has social and political significance -- went through what we can call a stage of a shift in wealth; that is, fortunes did not change in Morocco in the sixties because growth was not high, but a significant portion of them shifted from foreigners to Moroccans. Morocco went through a stage of shift although the "basket" did not grow. What was in the basket to a large extent was in the hands of foreigners, and that shifted to the hands of some Moroccans. Who were these Moroccans? They were first of all the new bourgeoisie that grew without independent intellectual effort or labor, which is where its ideological and political weakness lay. Indeed, it took off thanks to government contributions, which gave it the power to benefit from the shift, that is, to take the land, or part of the land, which was in the possession of the colonialists, and of course assume the difficulties or some of the difficulties that were in the hands of the colonialists. Some Moroccans from the middle or poor classes benefitted from this shift; the number of Moroccan government officials at the start of independence was no greater than 50,000 but at the end of the sixties it was greater than 300,000. Therefore a shift occurred and enabled society to pass beyond crisis.

The Policy of Sanctifying Class Differences

At that time the literature of the union did not talk about crisis; rather, it concentrated on two basic points:

First, the economic and social policy followed was the policy of the sanctification of liberalism and attachment to the foreign market.

Second, economic and social policy, which was called the policy of the shift, sanctified social differences. Nonetheless, at the end of the sixties some misgivings arose. It appeared that in spite of the shift, which gave

some social classes a sort of oxygen and enabled the country to follow through with its presence, some political shocks occurred toward the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies, and it became apparent that for our part, and around us, in Algeria and elsewhere, and in the oil countries (starting at the end of the sixties and the early seventies) a kind of upsurge occurred in the third world, and it became apparent that it would be possible to raise the rate of growth in other countries.

A Shift in Economic Policy

Proceeding from these domestic and foreign facts, economic policy in Morocco went through a shift not in the qualitative, but in the quantitative, context. When I say that it did not experience a qualitative shift, that means that the policy of alienation and the consecration of social differences remained. However, it did experience a quantitative shift. That is, while the Moroccan government in the sixties was progressing slowly and not investing much, and did not want to have aspirations, in the first half of the seventies it wanted to have some aspirations and to increase investments. Proceeding from the international facts which permitted a rise in the prices of phosphate in 1973-74, and proceeding from domestic facts, which are that the political authorities had amassed power and had become able to be concerned with economic problems, that is, basically, quantitative matters, another shift occurred at that time, which resulted in:

1. A rise in the level of investment.
2. Moroccanization, that is, the shift which occurred slowly in the sixties started to occur with a sort of intensity in the seventies, proceeding from the Moroccanization laws, which were concerned with farmland and also the service and industry sectors.

Thus we can say that from 1973 to the end of 1977 Morocco experienced an increase in its investment and growth level, and at the same time differences became intensified, as I will show later, meaning that the differences were concentrated during periods of recession when the shift was slow, because it was accompanied by the concentration of political power, but became strong when we reached the stage of expansion, proceeding from international and domestic facts.

Entering the Stage of Crisis

After 1977, which is a point we must make in conjunction with what we can call the electoral experience, that is, the presence of a chamber of deputies and institutions, Morocco entered the stage of crisis which we are going through now, that is, the stage of deterioration which is greater than in the sixties, because there no longer were possibilities for a shift (the Moroccans, or, more correctly, some Moroccans, had assumed the inheritance, and there were no longer opportunities for internal oxygen), then the international market, in turn, entered a crisis, and was no longer able to save the situation. Therefore, we can say that we entered a comprehensive economic crisis. We entered the stage of the accumulation of the signs of crisis, in time and place.

Accumulation in time, because the level of domestic production experienced stagnation, and we can say permanent regression, since 1977; the greater the signs of crisis became, the greater the effect they had on the economic level and vital political and social forces.

Accumulation in place, because this crisis affects all economic and social sectors. Nonetheless, it does not affect all social classes. The classes which benefitted from the gradual shifts and the stage of intensive expansion in the first half of the seventies did not proceed to relinquish their position and the benefits they had realized during the crisis stage.

The Causes of the Crisis

Proceeding from this premise, I will try to analyze the current situation, setting forth from what could be called the causes of the crisis. In terms of the analysis (perhaps pedagogical), I will divide these causes (and this is a pro forma breakdown) into two parts:

1. The causes which are said to have imposed themselves on us, which we will try to discuss objectively and frankly, while at the same time seeking the weapons that will enable us to face our class adversaries and consequently imperialism. This objectivity will also enable us to be frank with ourselves and state the things we were not concerned with, or belittled, as the Moroccan left or Arab left.

2. There are the causes for which responsibility is borne by the dominant classes.

The Causes Which Were Imposed on Us

1. The causes which we could say were imposed on us are:

One, the international crisis.

Two, the drought and its repercussions.

Three, the military confrontation with the adversaries of our territorial unity and its repercussions.

We will try to discuss these causes, but, before that, I must point out that the right in Morocco, through its political message, from 1975 to 1977 was saying that there was no crisis in the world. What it was trying to say, underneath that, was that capitalism could not experience a deep crisis. When it said that there was no crisis, the right in Morocco was using this statement to defend the capitalist system. On some occasions it was said that the crisis would pass. That was the first part of the message. The second part extended approximately from 1977 to 1981. It admitted that there was a crisis in Morocco, but it said that that was imported and that the foreign world, therefore, was responsible; we will make the foreign world which we had been defending bear the responsibility as long as the literature of crisis has imposed its presence; we are not responsible. The political message, therefore, stated that we would be able to cope with the

crisis. Then from 1982 to now the political message has started to admit that there are internal indicators to the crisis.

The Crisis Is Connected to the Capitalist System

Meanwhile the political message of the Socialist Union, since the beginning of the seventies, stated first and foremost that there was a crisis in the capitalist system, in the international and domestic contexts. The causes of this crisis are connected to the capitalist system and its application in the surrounding societies, among them ours. Another cause also was subjective, that is, domestic. Perhaps our fighting men belittled the effect of the international crisis. It must not be belittled, and we must state that the great danger is in belittling or exaggerating certain elements. The crisis at present is imposing itself on everyone, and the real crisis is not crisis, but the failure to sense crisis. The right in Morocco did not feel the crisis in time, and consequently the lack of awareness of crisis prompted it to pursue the same policy it had pursued in the past, and we are still observing not just a failure of acknowledgment in the political message but also a lack of awareness. Thus the important thing is not to refer to the crisis through figures; rather, the important thing is to be aware of crisis, to reach the conclusions regarding it, and to perceive ways to guarantee that it is transcended and overcome.

Repercussions of the International Crisis

The first element: the international crisis and its repercussions:

We cannot say that the international crisis affects us. It of course has been affecting our society and affecting the Moroccan economy in recent years because of certain facts. The rise in the price of oil, for instance, imposed bills for oil on us, and that is something we must not belittle. Morocco now is paying 6 or 7 months' worth of exports on oil imports. This is an objective matter. I will show later on that we can overcome it to some extent.

It is certain that the recession, unemployment and crisis in the capitalist countries impose burdens on us. Proceeding from the current recession in Europe, whose severity increased 6 years ago, our exports have become faced with some tight conditions. Moroccan manpower is being expelled and our goods are facing what could be called the policy of neoprotectionism. The structural transformations which during these years have been affecting the capitalist economies and have been initiated in the United States (especially in the area of California), Japan and Germany, and in the most recent stage have reached France, are preventing the industrialization of the third world and are leading to the expulsion of manpower and the creation of a number of constrictions. This is something we must acknowledge and whose consequences we must examine. The rise in the price of the dollar, also, has led to a rise of approximately 20 percent in our indebtedness in the last 2 years, and the worrisome expansion in the scope of the European Common Market could create great obstacles as far as our exports and Moroccan manpower are concerned. Therefore we must not belittle these facts. However, and when we say however, [that means] we must face the class enemies.

[20 Apr 84 p 3]

[Text] In yesterday's issue we presented the first part of the presentation which our brother Fathallah Lahlou gave at the fifth national meeting of the Union Youth on the current economic situation in Morocco, in which he talked about the challenges facing the left in general (the challenge of democracy, the challenge embodied in the confrontation with the economic and social situation, and the challenge of what is known as the Sahara issue). In the course of it he also talked about the notion of the crisis and the stages which the economic policy followed since the beginning of the sixties, which has led to a deepening of class differences and a consecration of our attachment to the foreign markets, has gone through, then after that moved over to a discussion of the causes of the current economic crisis.

We herewith present the second part of this presentation, and we will present its third part in the next issue.

The Policy of the Consecration of Subservience

The class adversaries in Morocco bear the responsibility for refusing to acknowledge the existence of the crisis since the early seventies, out of defense of the capitalist system. They bear two historic responsibilities, because they have turned Morocco into a receptive structure into which crisis can infiltrate easily, from two starting points:

The first starting point is the colonialist structural options of the post-independence stage, which put the sectors of food supply, the sectors of the absorptive industries, and the vital sectors on the sidelines, making us now, in the eighties, compelled both to buy oil, because it is not available to us, of course, and to buy milk, food oil and foodstuffs, which has caused our technological despoliation to be linked to our class despoliation (and to our despoliation in terms of food). Placing these sectors on the sidelines then benefitted other sectors, those which respond to the needs and desires of the social elite.

The second starting point is connected to the first one. That is that, proceeding from these options, they have paved the way for a sort of social structure in which the minority, which basically eats our production and surplus, will dominate, without participating productively in production, and consequently will function as a medium, entree and means for insinuating the Western model of production and consumption and an avenue for the consolidation of subordination.

Therefore we are not belittling the crisis and are not denying the effect it has on the Moroccan economy. However, we do say that the crisis has had an effect because of the dominant options, and consequently, when everyone now says that it is necessary to confront the international crisis, that will require confronting the reasons which caused us easily and intensively to accept this crisis.

A Progressive International Front for Dealing with Imperialism

Therefore we, as the left, must not belittle the crisis. People will ask me, what is the solution so that we can play a part in the international crisis? I am not saying that it is in our ability alone, as Morocco, to confront the international crisis, but we can say that it is in our ability to contribute to the creation of an international progressive front to confront imperialism. The contribution will be related to the nature of the domestic political options, and, in order for us to be able to participate in creating such a front, we must first and foremost be nationalists, progressives and democrats in our domestic options. What I say about Morocco I could say about Algeria, Tunisia and all Arab countries. I consider that the apostasy which the front of confrontation with imperialism is experiencing, which we can observe through the state the Palestinian cause and conditions in the Arab world have reached, is at the same time an apostasy with respect to economic and political options, that is, regarding the cause of democracy in the Arab world. Consequently, the domestic confrontation of problems is related to the foreign confrontation, and if there is domestic decadence, that will obstruct the establishment of fronts.

The right might talk about the crisis and acknowledge it, having ignored it previously, but it is not working to get our country to take part in this front alongside other countries, because the matter does not just concern Morocco. In Latin America, for instance, everyone is waiting to see whether democracy can win in a country like Brazil, if it wins in Brazil whether it will infiltrate into other countries, and if it experiences a setback there whether it will experience a similar setback in the other Latin American countries. The democratic struggle therefore is a struggle against imperialism at the same time.

The Repercussions of the Drought

The second element: the drought:

We cannot deny that the drought has had a great effect on the Moroccan economic situation for 6 years. It directly affects more than 60 percent of the population and indirectly affects the overall Moroccan economy.

When agricultural production shrinks, relations between the town and the countryside and between industry and agriculture shrink, and migration with all its results in the form of the creation of poverty and marginalization which we are familiar with increase.

In addition, the aggravation of the drought is now leading to crisis in energy derived from water. The drop in hydraulic energy production makes it mandatory that we buy more oil and consequently imposes greater burdens on us.

We must, as unionists, realize that there is an unhealthy policy regarding the drought because it creates a kind of relationship between small peasants and the authorities which is characterized by subordination and in some cases could result in making them more receptive to what the administrative agencies dictate to them.

Here, also, we can say that the officials, in their turn, bear responsibility as far as the issues of the drought are concerned. If we analyze the history of the development of the Moroccan economy and the African economy in general, we will find a kind of cycle which is familiar with constant years of drought. We can say that we are going through this now. Morocco experienced it in the 1880's and in the mid-forties. Essentially, the important thing is that we as a country on the Mediterranean must be affected by drought in certain years, and consequently the drought must enter into planning strategy and be taken into account in the regulation of water consumption in agriculture or human use. It must also enter into local strategic considerations, and we can say that Moroccan planning has not yet taken the phenomenon of drought into consideration at all. The most recent planning is founded on having water always available.

We can say that there is a dominant element in Moroccan economic strategy, which we can call the policy of dams or irrigation policy, whose importance we belittled, perhaps, at a certain time. It is now apparent, through Moroccan experience or other experiences (such as the experience with the High Dam in Egypt, for instance), that we must draw some conclusions, which are that great dams are not dams of great productivity, indeed, that what is known as small irrigation can be adapted to the climatic condition of our countries.

Approaches of a capitalistic nature, that is, those which impose the use of capital in concentrated form, are those which lead some of our countries, especially Morocco, to give priority to the policy of large-scale irrigation. In addition to that, there is a social problem, which is the distribution of the water available; that is distributed in an unequal, unfair manner between peasants and consumers in the towns, which gives the phenomenon of drought, an objective phenomenon, a worse economic and social effect than it should have.

The drought! Yes, we must not belittle it. However, there are responsibilities. In addition to that, there is poor management. When we say poor management, we do not mean basically a lack of intelligence among managers; rather, we mean bribery and influence-peddling, and all the practices that are related to class backgrounds, because the dominant classes here are those which are inclined to derive benefit without individual intellectual effort.

The Burdens of Confronting the Enemies of Territorial Unity

The third element is confronting the enemies of our territorial unity.

In this regard, the official message, on many occasions, states that confronting the enemies of territorial unity imposes burdens on us that affect reality. This statement has been repeated approximately every year since 1977.

We do not belittle this element, but we appeal for an analysis of it. Let us note that things are not so serious and that in any case we must realize that things will not change in the future.

A. When the issue of our Sahara territories, whose return was sought, was raised, the officials considered that the file would be closed quickly (in 1975), which meant that we did not need to prepare ourselves economically, socially and circumstantially for the chaos of a long term war. The Socialist Union said, "The case has been opened." When we said that, we meant that even if it has been closed, as far as the Moroccans, who had liberated their territory, were concerned, the confrontation would not end as long as the enemies of our territorial integrity were working to confront us, which dictated that we do three things in order to defend the unity of national territory (which meant that we should impose on the other party, that is, Algeria, recognition of the Moroccaness of the Sahara):

Combative, strong diplomacy.

Real democracy in order to defend the Moroccan identity.

The introduction of military confrontation into planning, economic policy and economic reality.

However, the planners were not concerned with this element, because they considered that the case would be closed. It was not. Rather, it proceeded to impose itself every year, from day to day, on our finances, although we did not introduce [it] into our economic strategy.

B. We are going through a military confrontation in which Morocco has recorded tangible victories. In this context, we must not forget that the Socialist Union, through its political bureau, has always given directives to the unionist opposition saying "confront everything in parliament, but vote for military expenditures." Voting for military expenditures is not just a national option, but will lead to the realization of gains on the military stage. We can say, most frankly, that if Morocco has realized anything positive at this stage, it is in this area.

The Imposition of a Sacrificial Tax on Everyone Who Has the Means

However, the economic planners did not take that into account, since Moroccan society was not subject to a war economy. When I say Moroccan society, I mean the rich classes in Morocco which have not paid a war tax in a material sense. No foreigner visiting Morocco and seeing the way the rich classes live will believe that our country is waging war in its southern region. This is happening at a time when it is going to every length to acquire revenues because of the economic crisis. Therefore, we say that if it is necessary to follow up on the military confrontation, and if it is necessary to strengthen the military front, we must impose a sacrificial tax on the people who have the means -- an economic crisis tax and a confrontation tax.

C. The third element the Socialist Union has raised a number of times, which entered into officials' consideration just 2 months ago, is that every country in the world today is going through a confrontation in order to define its identity and that means that whether or not the Sahara issue exists, our country, unfortunately, is supposed to give great importance to military matters, especially [as it is] among the countries of the third world,

because international confrontations exist, and this is something that has been imposed on everyone. The Sahara issue has underlined that here; it might also be underlined by other issues, and this problem will not end in the world unless regional fronts are formed to some extent, because the confrontations will be strong in the future. Morocco's location on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and the confrontations that now exist between a number of African countries, because identities have not yet been determined, will cause the military challenges to impose themselves over the long range.

There is a law in every society, which is learned from wars: with respect to all the countries that entered World War Two, and also in Egypt, which is not longer in a state of war, and in China and Pakistan, it has been observed that when countries go to war to defend their identity, the level of expenditures rises greatly, and when these wars end these expenditures do not drop; rather, they remain at the level where they were. This is an economic law which applies with respect to individuals and groups. therefore, we must not expect that when the problem of the Sahara ends, this problem will end the next day; rather, we must strive to have the expenses that are made to protect the country assume a positive character.

The three reasons I mentioned above are not imposed on us; rather, they are objective reasons which we must confront and remedy. They may impose themselves on us but not completely so.

[21 Apr 84 pp 3, 5]

[Text] In yesterday's issue and that of the day before yesterday, we published the first and second parts of the presentation our brother Fathallah Lahlou made at the fifth national meeting of the unionist youth on the current economic situation in our country.

After our brother Fathallah spoke at the beginning of his contribution about the three challenges facing the left in general and the Moroccan left in particular, and after he had defined the conception of the crisis, he moved on to talk about the stages through which the economic policy followed in our country since the beginning of the sixties, which has led to the current economic crisis our country has been stumbling through for a number of years, has been going through, analyzing its objective and subjective causes.

Herewith is the third and final part of this review.

The Subjective Causes

Those are the causes which one might claim are imposed on us; these are four causes based on human will:

1. The nature of the economic, social and cultural policy that is followed. It is a voluntary policy, on the part of reaction, to intensify differences, put basic requirements on the sidelines, give attention to the wishes of the elite and turn us into a society which gives priority to liberal class

options. This cause has led the crisis to find itself in the presence of a body which is capable of embracing it and giving the crisis not only an international character but also a domestic one.

It is not easy for this body, which has continued to travel in this direction for a period of more than 70 years (that is, more than 40 years under the protectorate and more than 20 years after independence), to change overnight. When we talk about the revolution which occurred recently in Guinea, we must realize that conditions in that country will not change overnight, but rather it cannot transcend 26 years overnight; consequently, the aggravated nature of the situation has made it harder to face it now than in the past. The hardest thing facing the forces of the left that are now in power in some European countries such as France (which is governed by the Socialist and Communist Parties) and Spain, in addition to the international and domestic crisis of course, is the economic structure which was built centuries ago and is hard to change overnight.

2. The social structure: Since we have dominant classes here, in the public and private sectors, we must avoid confrontation between the sectors in this regard, because the [existence of the] public sector does not mean nationalization, that is, the fact that the public sector serves essentially national options. Rather, what we do observe is that the two sectors, in industry, agriculture, services or administration, have developed in serving the socially affluent; these differences have caused this social structure to make it easy to focus the crisis and have made the masses bear the burden of the crisis.

A Subservient Right Wing

While this social structure has, in economic, social and political terms, given the right the opportunity to dominate, it has been distinguished by ideological weakness and inability to defend itself in its literature or its messages. It is a right wing which expects everything from the government, expects donations, aid, protection, and municipal and parliamentary seats from it; it is a right wing which is not independent of the administrative system, as is the case in the capitalist countries, so that consequently, if it were independent, democracy in our country would have advanced. In order for democracy in our countries to advance we need an independent right, so that we can confront it, but the right here is not independent; it is connected in a subservient manner to the administrative agencies or to imperialism. It is mercantilist in character economically and it is basically a client by nature politically. In either case it has no social plans. This is the reason why its material dominance is one of the causes of the general crisis in the country. It might be beneficial for us to have an organized right and to confront it, for it to confront us, and to have the rules of the democratic game respected. It might defeat us but if the rules of the game are respected we might defeat it later, but in this case the confrontation will be clear. The challenge which exists here now in Morocco for the sake of democracy, as I personally see it, is that for the left to perform its responsibility we must obligate the right to organize itself in a way where it is independent of the government and must not rely on "minute coccotte" parties, because these parties are not capable of constant

confrontation and consequently are not able to bear their responsibility on behalf of democracy because in practice they are against democracy. That is the challenge we are facing.

The Oil Royalty Phase

3. The third cause is the policy which was followed from 1973 to 1977. The domestic causes are embodied in the recession of the sixties, with all the problems it led to. The foreign causes are embodied in the leap in oil [prices] and the start of industrialization in some countries, which made it mandatory that Morocco raise its level of investments and work to advance the cause of Moroccanization (the recovery of what once belonged to foreigners). At that time, the circumstances of the rise in the phosphate price occurred, but rather than benefiting from these circumstances for the sake of the national options, and rather than benefiting from the Moroccanization processes for the sake of the national and progressive options, these facts were exploited in favor of the minority. What happened in 1973 was the following: revenues came in which we were not prepared for, the same thing happened in other Arab countries, and Arab society began to experience the oil royalty phase, a phase that has led to further deterioration rather than progress because it has resulted in the spread of laziness and dictatorship in those countries.

What happened in 1977 is that revenues proliferated and officials started to dream and decided to increase expenditures, by constructing roads and infrastructure and building projects which they had not dreamed of before. While the level of revenues and the level of investments (that is, expenditures for the sake of roads, buildings and industrial projects) had been low but on a par in the sixties, revenues rose starting in 1973 because of three elements:

A. Phosphate.

B. Arab money, which came in the wake in the rise of the oil price.

C. Moroccanization.

Loan Policy

When these revenues increased, officials proceeded to raise their social ambitions in favor of the minority. However, after a year, revenues dropped, while expenditures remained at the same high level where they had been. At this point officials were then faced with two options:

To reduce the level of spending, in which case the dominant classes which benefitted from the increase would have to accept that.

Or to keep the high level of spending, in which case it would be necessary to look for people who would pay the money to compensate for the phosphate; that is, it would be necessary to look for loans. That is what happened in the mid-seventies. Debts were asked for in abundance, and international capitalism and the oil countries helped in this scandal, giving us loans at a

time when our revenues were still very low. Thus the debts started constantly to increase while the revenues diminished, until the day came when the International Monetary Fund intervened and told us, "Come let us see!" Therefore responsibility for the crisis exists. That is the responsibility of excessive spending between 1973 and 1977, that is, the abnormal increase which benefited a specific class. Therefore, we can accuse our class adversaries of responsibility for what happened, the excessive spending and the practices related to it, such as bribery and influence peddling, since a person who is accustomed to a specific standard of living will seek other ways of remaining at the same income after his revenues shrink, and one of these ways is bribery. Bribery, as a social, class and political phenomenon which dominated in particular in the past 6 years, is also connected to these classes' habituation to a specific level of consumption and excessive spending which they do not want to abandon.

The Design for "Reflection" Is the Design for Stagnation

4. The fourth cause is the policy followed since 1978. Officials that year felt that the government no longer had adequate revenues available and decided to apply a 3-year plan which they called "the design for reflection" which called for a reduction in the level of investments, however on the basis that that would continue for the period of 3 years, because the official message stated that the crisis was accidental.

In this case, since it will continue for a period of only 3 years, it is necessary that we exert pressures not on all sectors, but basically on the rich classes. However, this policy of contraction and reflection which has been applied in these first 3 years has not led to the desired result for two reasons:

First, because it was not accompanied by social reforms, but to the contrary the differences increased during the period of contraction, as they increased during the period of expansion. They increased in the period of "contraction" through "transfers" and through incomes from bribery, basically. They increased during the period of expansion through transfers (Moroccanization). In either case, the poor classes did not experience an improvement in their condition in the expansion periods but they did experience a deterioration in the periods of contraction.

The second contraction was that in those 3 years Morocco nonetheless continued to obtain loans from abroad to work to finance its investments, which continued to be characterized by excessive spending; that is, when we embarked on the policy of contraction we did not reduce our excessive spending. After 3 years had gone by it was said, "Now, in any event, we have dealt with the problem; we have reflected, and we can take off again as we did in 1973. Therefore, we will prepare a 5-year design." However, when Morocco wanted to take off, it found itself unable to do so, and that is what is happening now. The 3-year policy has now become a 6-year policy, a policy which can officially end only in 1985. The crisis is no longer to be considered voluntary but has become imposed on us. At this point we enter into relations with the International Monetary Fund.

Morocco and the International Monetary Fund

It is not necessary for us to attack the International Monetary Fund very much. We can attack it in a specific framework, but we must take note of the features of our own shortcomings, and what can be said about Morocco applies roughly to about 70 countries. Morocco's condition is not worse than that of the other countries, but the problem as far as we are concerned is that we possess the political awareness which causes us to be unwilling to be on a level with some other African countries, and we have the history, struggle and political forces which make it mandatory that we have the ambition to ameliorate our condition.

The International Monetary Fund is an organization, not a "monster" that is imposing its will on the countries that deal with it. It was established in 1945 in the context of the international monetary system by all countries, of course in the framework of the dominance of the capitalist countries, essentially the United States. The fund's task, as far as the member countries go, is to encourage them to act so that they may have the resources to respond to what the outer world will demand of them, that is, they must repay the debts they owe so that they can contribute to the international monetary balance, because, if they do not have access to the resources to return what the international society asks from them, they will contribute to international monetary disruption, and the International Monetary Fund and the United States, basically, bear the responsibility for this disruption.

The international monetary system seems to be managed by the International Monetary Fund but is managed in practice by the capitalist system, through two basic forces:

First, the major countries, headed by the United States, Japan and the European Common Market.

Second, the multinational companies.

This regime was created by organizations that have apparent power, represented by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and therefore we must not attack them but the capitalist system, because they are just tools of the capitalist system.

The fund, therefore, asks you to arrange the resources to pay back debts, because if you do not repay your debts you will cause a disruption. Therefore, it watches over you and tells you, I am not compelling you to do anything, because you enjoy political independence, but if you do not have the ability to repay your debts, that is, if I observe that you will be contributing to the international monetary disruption, I will tell that to the whole world and consequently I will be telling all the countries that are helping you, "Just do not help that country!"

The International Monetary Fund gives the green light and we must confront it by confronting the capitalist system, that is, basically, through the options of the United States, especially in current circumstances, under

Reaganite policy, which says that in order for progress in societies to occur, there must be a discrepancy, because societies in which a form of justice exists cannot develop. That is the Reaganite thinking. In order for American society to develop, there must be areas of poverty in it. These areas are the blacks, the Puerto Ricans, and the unemployed. In order for the international economy to develop, there must be a discrepancy, embodied in the presence of the backward poorest countries.

Reagan's Policy of Impoverishment

This policy of course leads to contradictions, because when you go to the maximum limits, the victims of this policy create problems. The poor people of the United States and the poor people of the third world create problems. We must confront this policy in the framework of liberationist diplomacy. This is something in which we must participate alongside others. Therefore there must be an internal struggle so that our countries can play a role in creating a unified front.

The rules of the game in the International Monetary Fund resemble those in a company. Voting in it yields results because each member in it has access to a percentage of votes which are equal to his shares, causing the United States to have 24 percent of the votes, the European Common Market 23 percent of the votes and Japan 8 percent. When these three parties (without Canada) join forces, they control the decisions of the fund because they have more than 50 percent of the votes. That is, voting in the fund is not of the democratic character that it is in the United Nations.

The abovementioned countries support the Reaganite policy of impoverishment, which calls for fighting inflation in the world, basically, through a reduction in domestic incomes in the United States and in the incomes of various peoples. To that end, it is necessary to raise the interest rate in order to reduce consumption and investments, which imposes burdens on the poor classes in the capitalist world and on the poor societies in the world.

The International Monetary Fund tells you "I am not concerned with what you do in your country; what concerns me is that you have debts which you must pay back (this is what it tells Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Algeria, to some extent, and of course Morocco), in order to contribute to the economic community; otherwise, you will face constrictions."

A Joint Responsibility

Here we must direct a political accusation at the capitalist world: if our rulers bear serious responsibility, as embodied in the initiative they took in the seventies when they took debts from the world market without thinking about the degree of ability to repay them, the capitalist world also bears responsibility. How so? After 1973, the oil price rose and the surpluses of oil countries with limited populations proliferated. These countries proceeded to squander this money (and we all know the destructive effect of this excessive spending on the Arab world) or put it in the banks of the capitalist world. Thus these banks found themselves faced with a massive financial reserve which prompted them to offer easy loans. Indeed, the

appraisals of economic conditions in the countries that asked for loans began to be made with a sort of leniency (Morocco has the ability, Algeria has the ability, Brazil has the ability, and so forth). However, these countries today do not have this ability! After the oil price dropped and the surpluses shrank, the banks started to ask these countries to pay back their debts. Therefore, if there is a responsibility, it is a joint one. Brazil is now posing a problem to the capitalist world because it is refusing to pay back the debts in full and is demanding that its debts be rescheduled (Brazil is the first to raise the issue of rescheduling), on grounds that it is the major capitalist countries that bear the responsibility. Indeed, some Brazilian economists, such as Fortado, say in the name of national sovereignty we must not repay our debts because it is imperialism which has prompted the dominant classes to acquire the debts!

Of course, the only country which can take this decision is Brazil. However, there is the United States, which prevents it from doing that, lest that be a precedent which might constitute an example for others. Therefore, the only solution now is rescheduling: "We will give you a period of 3 years in which to repay the debts, on grounds that the international situation will develop later and the problems will be solved."

Let us go back to Morocco. The International Monetary Fund came to Morocco in 1980 and said that the policy followed required some reform. It warned the officials that they would face serious financial difficulties in 2 years and therefore asked them to reduce expenditures.

The Fable of the Budget Fund

It was apparent to the fund that the dominant classes were not ready to sacrifice themselves and were not ready to abandon the policy of excessive spending. Therefore, since the officials were not prepared to reduce military expenditures, for political reasons, and were not ready to reduce excessive spending, for social reasons, the only solution was to increase the prices of foodstuffs, which meant lowering or eliminating the subsidies the government offered for these goods. Thus, the discussion started to revolve about the budget fund, which turned into a sort of fable.

When the latest events occurred in Tunisia and Morocco, the officials of the International Monetary Fund started to tell Morocco, "We did not ask you to increase prices. It is true that we want a sort of price realism, but what we basically asked you was to reduce consumption. How? That is your business!" However, the problem our society faces is that you cannot refuse to make sacrifices in consumption (that is, to reduce excessive spending and some administrative expenses) without raising the prices of basic goods. It is necessary to choose between the two things. You cannot ask the poor classes to raise the price without asking the same thing of the other classes.

The International Monetary Fund of course addresses you from a liberal premise. It might consider that it is in your interest to raise the price of grain, because that might result in encouraging peasants to increase productivity. It might consider that it is in your interest to increase prices of

food oils, because that will encourage peasants to increase the yield. Thus, the notion can be accepted, on condition that it be accompanied by a rise in incomes.

However, what happened in Morocco is that the officials refused to reduce the excessive spending the rich classes engaged in and refused to reduce the excessive spending by the administration, while at the same time they refused to increase salaries and set out an increase in the prices of basic materials. Here is where the whole problem lies.

Accusations against the International Monetary Fund

Here, also, we must direct an accusation against the International Monetary Fund and tell it:

We accuse you of being liberal.

Because when money was given out in the seventies, as loans, you did not say, beware, beware!

Because you basically focus on the common classes, which leads to incidents.

Therefore the International Monetary Fund in 1980 asked Morocco to pay attention! However, it did not; 1981 came and the first rises occurred, with no consultation with the people concerned with the matter, that is, the unions. This prompted the Socialist Union and the Democratic Federation of Labor to bear their responsibilities, which led to the well known incidents. While the DFL boasted of bearing the responsibility for the legitimate strike which it resolved on, it considers that it does not bear any responsibility for the incidents which occurred, which resulted from the provocations the government made, headed by the 28 May decree, and it was "necessary" that the incidents be followed by a campaign of repression. Repression, proceeding from that, became a way of managing economic activity.

Here, when we hear that the people assigned with repression interfere a great deal, that is because in addition to performing their duties in a manner which we do not accept, they are now also interfering in economic areas. Here the security element has become merged with the economic element, even in the dialogue with the unions and so forth.

After the end of [fiscal] 1982-83, the International Monetary Fund came back and said, your level of indebtedness has risen in a frightful fashion, having reached \$10 billion. It is true that the price of wheat has risen, it is true that there is the drought, it is true that the oil bills have cost you a great deal, but you did not take these considerations into account, and now you must think of a way that will enable you to pay back your debts. I cannot help you and I cannot give others the green light to continue to help you, although the capitalist world (or even the Soviet Union) are not prepared to abandon Morocco, and we must take that into our consideration; because Morocco has a geopolitical location, it cannot be "abandoned." If one of the great powers abandons it, the other will come forward.

The International Monetary Fund's Conditions

Thus the International Monetary Fund asked Morocco to pay its debts. However, the latter asked for a rescheduling. The fund agreed to help Morocco, as did France, while Morocco found difficulties with the United States for reasons connected to internal contradictions in the United States -- relations between congress and the president, the presence of the United States in all areas of the world, and its preoccupation with issues related to the "security" of Israel, Bangladesh, South Africa and Egypt, which Morocco comes after in order of importance, so that therefore there are priorities which prompted the United States to place obstacles before the rescheduling of Morocco's debts, unlike France. Why? Because France is making up to Algeria, and is trying to create a sort of balance, in view of the importance of Morocco's strategic location and so forth.

However, in spite of all that, it was necessary to get the green light from the International Monetary Fund. However, the latter told Morocco, "In order for me to give this green light, I will ask you for a program for a period of 2 years. The purpose of this program will be to reduce consumption (tighten the belt further). How can one reduce consumption?

"1. By suspending hiring.

"2. By increasing the prices of basic materials.

"3. By obtaining new revenues (by imposing additional taxes).

"The important thing is to create a kind of balance, and at that point I will tell the world that Morocco has created a kind of balance and therefore you can help it and agree to reschedule its debts."

An agreement (an unsigned agreement) was reached with the bank in July 1983 on this program, which is called the 1983-84 program. It stipulates that the creditor countries will accept the principle of rescheduling in exchange for Morocco's performance of certain reforms domestically. Thus, increases occurred in prices in July and what is known as the "amended law" to the financial law was offered the same month. Negotiations with the banks and the creditor countries started in August and September 1983, and the latter agreed to the rescheduling of the debts (not just with respect to Morocco, but with respect to a number of other countries). However, this agreement was not signed, in anticipation of the month of December, when a further increase in prices would take place, and then the green light would be given to the offer of aid by the International Monetary Fund and the application of rescheduling. Therefore there was an agreement in principle, but it did not go into effect.

The Continuation of Negotiations with the Fund

Alongside that, the issue of the Sahara, in particular the issue of the referendum which was to be held in December, came up. The issue of the elections, which were to be held in January and February, also came up. In this context, the current cabinet was formed and the Socialist Union is bearing its responsibility in the well known context, which basically is:

The effort to confront the issue of democracy.

The effort to take part in confronting the issue of the Sahara.

However, one thing which is not related to us is the negotiations and relations with the International Monetary Fund, which stipulated the application of new price increases in December 1983. Of course, the incidents occurred in December. A census was also made of people with limited incomes, which in spite of its unscientific concepts gave an idea of the poor, and a decision was made not to increase prices.

At that time the International Monetary Fund asked Morocco to take some other decisions which would compensate for those taken in July 1983, so that the green light could be given! Negotiations now have been underway for approximately 3 weeks between the Ministry of Finance and the International Monetary Fund on the compensatory decrees which will be most certainly taken in the next few days.

No Solution Except Democracy

In concluding this review, let me refer to two points:

If the right bears the responsibility for the crisis of capitalism in the world, and in Morocco, and if it is possible for us to say that the crisis will continue, we, as the left, must not belittle the crisis and its repercussions: the Moroccan people, and the vital forces in the country, must confront it in conjunction with our confrontation of the crisis of democracy. Things are not so difficult in the advanced countries; the left in these countries is asked to "manage the crisis," but in a clear democratic framework, which means that it might succeed and it might not succeed. In this case, it could fail in the coming elections and return in the elections that follow them.

In our country, however, the problem is more difficult. First of all there is no solution over the long run except through democracy. The matter is not related to the Socialist Union's advent to power, because the union is not interested in seats. What interests it, rather, basically, is respect for the game of democracy. Therefore, in this context, we must consider that deep radical changes are difficult to realize but the road to them can be traveled.

Historic experience shows that if the union has played a historic role in our society, that is the role of paving the way on behalf of democracy and change, though we had believed, through the experience of the national forces in the third world, that change would be possible overnight. The fact is that what can be achieved now is the effort to pave the road for democracy in order to participate in solving the economic, social and financial crisis which is part of the overall crisis.

MOROCCO

STATISTICS ON UNEMPLOYMENT REPORTED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 6 Apr 84 p 7

[Text] The 3 September 1982 census found that there were 642,182 unemployed persons and 5,357,078 active persons. The inactive population numbered 14,260,572, distributed as follows:

| | |
|------------------|-----------|
| Women at home: | 4,341,981 |
| School children: | 3,551,224 |
| Others: | 6,367,367 |

The active population has increased 48.4 percent in 11 years, with an annual growth rate 3.6 percent higher than the rate of demographic growth. It may be said, then, that the active population is growing in comparison with the total population. In 1971, 26.2 or every 100 persons were active, while in 1982 the ratio is 30 out of every 100. The proportion of women in the active population is 20 percent, compared with 15 percent in 1971. The percentage of active population is greater in the cities than in rural areas, and has evolved as follows:

Urban areas:

| | |
|-------|--------------|
| 1971: | 26.2 percent |
| 1982: | 30.4 percent |

Rural areas:

| | |
|-------|--------------|
| 1971: | 26.3 percent |
| 1982: | 29 percent |

It is interesting to note that the percentage of active population in 1971 was greater in the rural areas than in the cities. This tendency has been reversed in 11 years.

Unemployment

For the first time, precise figures have been furnished on unemployment. The census counted 650,000 unemployed, but of this total, 285,357 stated that they had sought work for the first time.

The unemployment rate has increased significantly in 11 years:

1971: 349,273

1982: 642,182

Out of an increase of 292,909 unemployed, there are practically as many in the cities as in the rural areas, even though in 1974 the proportion was 2/3 for the urban areas. Unemployment, therefore, has increased chiefly in rural areas. The overall unemployment rate, defined as the ratio between the unemployed population and the total active population, was 10.7 percent, compared with 8.7 percent in 1971. In urban areas the rate is 12.3 percent, compared with 9.5 percent in rural areas.

Unemployment Among Youth

Unemployment especially affects the young, which is normal, given the age pyramid. Thus the number of unemployed under 25 years of age rose, as of 3 September 1982, to 364,500, of whom 80 percent were seeking work for the first time.

For those between 20 and 25 years of age the unemployment rate is 18 percent, while in the 15-19 age bracket it is 25 percent. However, this latter rate reveals gaps and lapses in school attendance and professional training, rather than access to employment in administration and factories, and is valid only for those 18 years of age and over.

Unemployment among the young is evidently greater in the cities--20.5 percent for youth from 20 to 25 years of age--while in rural areas the rate is 15.5 percent.

Finally, unemployment affects more men than women. Among youth from 20 to 24 years of age, the urban unemployment rate is 20.9 percent for men and 19.6 percent for women, while in rural areas it is 10.9 percent for women and 16.2 percent for men.

8735

CSO: 4519/150

ESTABLISHMENT OF SECOND LABOR UNION DISCUSSED

Tunis AL-SABAH in Arabic 22 Apr 84 pp 3, 5

[Interview with Habib Bouraoui, secretary general of Tunisian National Labor Federation: "Trade Union Supporters Were behind Establishment of National Federation; They Are the Ones Interested in Reforming the Union's Course; 50,000 Members; 12 Regional Unions; 10 Federations, and the Rest Is yet To Come; Trade Union Action Is not Built on the Ruins of Bankrupt Institutions"]

[Text] Two months have elapsed since the Tunisian National Labor Federation [UNTT] was established. During these 2 months numerous principal trade unions and sectional federations were organized. Numerous regional federations were also added. We conducted this comprehensive interview with Mr Abdelaziz Bouraoui, the secretary general of the UNTT to get a more concrete picture of the activities of this new labor organization and to ask about some of the difficulties that are standing in its way or the successes it has achieved in attracting a number of members. It's that which made the organization become a new fact on the political and labor union scene in the country.

[Question] Who is Mr Abdelaziz Bouraoui in the union?

[Answer] My career with the union began in April 1943, that is, since the departure of the axis powers. At that time the labor union movement had been weakened under the banner of the CGT. Late in May 1943 the late Ferhat Hached contacted us and asked us to organize a union in the regional hospital in Sfax where I was employed as a clerk. We organized the union at the request of Mr Ferhat who was not known to me then personally. I recall that Mr Tahar Akrou, who is a union member, had asked about the identity of the union, about its operating methods and whether or not it was communist. I also recall that the late Ferhat Hached told him, "If the union is communist, you won't find me in it." We remained in this condition from the end of 1943 till March 1944, when the CGT Congress was held in the capital, Tunis. I attended the congress along with the colleagues, Ferhat Hached, Habib Achour, Ali Boussabah and other union members from Sfax. At that time I was still taking my first steps in the union. I was the youngest of the group: I was about 10 years younger then they were.

The posters and slogans of the congress indicated that the CGT Union had communist tendencies. These tendencies dominated the congress despite the presence of another socialist movement along with it. The late Ferhat Hached had nothing to do with either tendency. He was, however, trying to place his mark and that of

Tunisian labor union members on the congress: he was trying to make the congress a congress for Tunisian labor union nationalists. We intended to walk out of the congress altogether, but Ferhat Hached declined, and we stayed until it was over. We returned the following day to our districts. I was one of the first to arrive in Sfax: I arrived on the following day at 11 a.m. Upon my arrival I went immediately to the hospital administration, and I got in touch with the manager, who was then Mr (Doulour), and asked his permission to hold a union meeting. Permission was granted, and the meeting was held at noon that day. It was a major historic meeting at which the union was disbanded. The rest of our colleagues also disbanded all the other unions despite the fact that some CGT leaders in Tunis contacted Mr Ferhat to return to the union.

We stayed without unions from 29 March 1944 till 19 November 1944 when we organized a union on Sidi Ali Karray Road in Elferiani Market in Sfax, at the old quarters of the railroad workers' union, the Federation of Independent Unions in the South. Mr Ferhat was named general secretary of that constituent federation which consisted of 17 unions. The responsibilities were distributed in this federation, and I was its treasurer. Besides, there were other responsibilities that were distributed among a number of colleagues in the federation. We continued working in this manner. Let me remind you that we were called then yellow referring to yellow unions. Today, some people still use that term to insult us. In the past that term was used to insult Mr Ferhat Hached.

Then we concentrated the labor union movement in Sfax and in the south where we got in touch with (Qabis) and Gabes. Then Mr Ferhat turned to Tunis and began getting in touch with union members, particularly leaders of the General Federation of Tunisian Civil Servants, which is an independent organization and headed by Sadok Chaibi. This was the case until a federation of independent unions was formed in the north and a federation of independent unions was formed in the central part of the country. All this culminated in the organization of the Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT] on 20 January 1946 at al-Khalduniyah Hall in the capital.

Suffice it to say that since January 1946 my union activities stopped only when I was in prison during the time of colonialism. My union activities stopped for other short periods of time after independence.

[Question] How do you explain the fact that you've stayed in the shadow of Mr Habib Achour and that you've not risen to prominence as a first-rate union leader just like Habib Achour and Ahmed Tlili, when you've been one of the founders and leaders of the labor union movement?

[Answer] We have always been characterized by selflessness modeled after the late Ferhat Hached who never chose to become secretary general or chief officer. Mr Ferhat was so modest that he let other colleagues take initiatives and assume responsibilities. For example, he did not want to meet officials alone. Instead, he would always be accompanied by colleagues. I personally used to do my work and carry out my responsibilities, and I did not want to stand out or be prominent. Why would you want me to stand out among other colleagues like me who founded the labor union movement? We always believed in collective work, and we did not consider anyone but Habib Achour as leader. We used to form a group that worked together in an orderly fashion, with harmony and a sense of pride in the responsibility we were assuming.

[Question] Has it ever happened that a secretary general of the federation was elected directly by the congress?

[Answer] This happened only once in 1977 at the suggestion of some people who were attending the congress. This was not because of attachment to the person, but because we felt there were those who wanted to change the secretary general at the time. That measure was tantamount to a reaction or a reply to those attempts. It was a measure required by circumstances to hold on to the secretary general.

[Question] People have known you to be one of those people who are very close to Habib Achour. Your relationship is a close one. How were you separated in the end? What is your explanation for that?

[Answer] To me the question is easy and simple. I have always believed that I was a person who follows principles and not individuals. If these principles are attacked and cease to exist, personal relationships become meaningless. In the past it was principles that brought us together, and today we are separated because of my insistence over these principles which are no longer important to some people.

[Question] Does this mean that the other party is no longer attached to the principles you started out with?

[Answer] As far as I am concerned, I consider myself to be holding on to the noble principles of the labor union for which Ferhat Hached made sacrifices. I will continue to be that way all my life.

[Question] Has this separation had moral effects on you personally?

[Answer] If we're talking about emotions, then what hurt me most was the fact that I was deprived of my struggle in the federation as an organization. I was unfairly expelled from the organization after 40 years of struggling in it.

[Question] After you were expelled from the federation, you had to choose one of three solutions. You could establish a labor union from the top; you could carry out the solution that you carried out, which is organize, basic, independent labor unions and then organize a federation; or you could seize control of the general federation. What were the conditions that made you choose one of these solutions?

[Answer] Actually, we did not choose any one of the three solutions. What we did do was not what we chose to do, but it was rather a choice that was dictated to us by labor union supporters.

A struggle within the federation requires one to stay and continue the fight within the organization. We did that almost 2 years ago. We've always worked and struggled for the right to exercise what we thought would correct the course of the union by working within the organization. But then there was a period when we began to despair of the possibility of correcting the course of democracy within the federation from within and peacefully. The day we decided to denounce some actions and transgressions that had to do with operations or labor union

activity, we expected to be turned over to an investigating committee, the one we had called for. The most we thought could happen was that we would be turned over to a disciplinary committee. Then we thought we might be turned over to the national congress which would resolve the problem. But the result was that we were denied the right to continue in the federation. The transgressions would not be looked into; an investigating committee was not to be formed; and we were not to be allowed to continue in the federation until the congress was convened. An unfair, illegal decision was made that contradicts section 18 of the charter which requires that certain investigative measures be taken [in such matters]. The decision that was made also violated section eight of the bylaws. We did not expect such a decision at all; it was unprecedented in the organization's history ever since it was founded. They were the reason we were denied the right to stay in the organization and to struggle from within and differ within its frameworks. We were not the ones who decided to suspend our daily activities unless the meetings of the Executive Bureau were not held, hoping to speed up the meeting of the national congress so as to settle the dispute once and for all. This is because the national congress is the highest labor union authority in the federation, and it was the national congress that did elect us in 1981. The question then should be directed to the group that expelled us, threw us out and denied us the right to stay in the organization. The question should not be directed to us. We were not the ones who thought of forming an organization; it was rather the supporters of the labor unions who expressed their dissatisfaction with what was going on. They were the ones who decided to organize a union.

[Question] Why did you issue a statement and have it widely publicized when it was supposed to be an in-house document?

[Answer] This subject has been altogether misrepresented because the process was basically an internal one, and it could affect the broadest labor union supporters. In this context a few copies of the statement could have been leaked and published in newspapers. If we were to assume that we were the ones who did that, was that something that would call for our ouster from the federation? Did we have to be stripped of our capacity as federation officials? I say this as though the deliberations of national councils and administrative bodies have always stayed confidential! Information has been leaked to the press many times about matters that were supposed to stay confidential. What is this big secret that we publicized to make the group decide to expel us?

And even before we--Habib Achour himself and I--organized the Tunisian Federation of Labor in 1956, we were not expelled by the leaders of the UGTT. Despite what we said and the information we published, we were not expelled from that organization until after the second organization was formed. In numerous trade unions and at numerous conferences, organizations and societies differences of opinion occur and even charges are made, but the outcome is not what the outcome was in this organization.

I believe that this point has to be clarified because many people support our view of labor union activity, but they are finding us at fault for the division that is taking place. But those people do not know that we were not the ones who chose that method. It was the other party that forced supporters of the labor union to adopt that method. They expelled us and denied us the right to stay in the organization and to express our different opinions within its frameworks and organizations.

[Question] If Mr Habib Achour were in a minority position, would you expel him from the federation?

[Answer] Never, although he was one day in a minority position, particularly when he was imprisoned. We were struggling for what was to us a matter of principle: we were defending Mr Habib Achour to have the emergency measures that were directed against him lifted. One of the reasons, and perhaps the principal reason that induced us to join the national front was to defend the removal of those emergency measures. Besides, we wanted to protect the federation's leadership role, a role which has always been at the forefront of the struggle for the country's independence and at the forefront of the struggle for legislative elections and other matters.

Including the federation in the national front along with the Destourian Socialist Party was also an implicit recognition of the fact that the federation was innocent in the events of 26 January 1978. When Achour came out of prison we could have made him a member of the Executive Bureau and not [just] president of the federation.

[Question] It is being said that it was this group--your group--that was opposed to the lifting of emergency measures.

[Answer] This is strange. This group wants this matter to become more complicated so that the problem would not be solved and so we would always be at the mercy of this group of people. The federation would then become their political game which they would control as they wish. But that was not what we wanted. We really did try to have the emergency measures lifted. And even the special decree at the Gafsa Congress which called for lifting the emergency measures was not put forth by those elements loyal to Achour. Those people withdrew, and they were about 125 delegates. We were the ones who proposed the decree and we were the ones who set a deadline for lifting those emergency measures by November 1981.

[Question] After having the broad majority that you used to have, you are now in the position of a minority. It is being said that when supporters turned away from you, you wanted to create a crisis within the federation so you could get out in an honorable manner.

[Answer] This is what has been said. But if what is being said is actually the truth, labor union supporters would not have required us to form an organization. And why did many other supporters ask to join the organization and organize their regional unions and sectional federations?

I am saying that it is our good intentions, our adherence to labor union principles and our attempts to improve conditions from within that alienated some supporters. This is not because they rejected us, but it is rather because numerous supporters despaired of our methods and our ways of defending them. They saw no relief from the unfair measures and illegal practices to which they were subjected, and they became frustrated with our positions which seemed to them weak and passive. Nevertheless, we have not given up on internal reform.

[Question] How do transgressions occur within the federation?

[Answer] Late in 1979 we found a pamphlet written by some extremist leftist groups in which they were proposing the elimination of Tijani Abid and his group and then eliminating Achour and his colleagues. Those colleagues stunned us all with their actions because we in the federation did not view each other in accordance with our ideological and political schools of thought, but we rather viewed each other on the bases of labor union principles only. I cannot turn down the application of any wage earner who wants to join the federation because of his political views! We wonder how matters in the federation came to the point at which various political groups and schools of thought would be defined! This was not one of our labor union traditions in the past even though there were political movements within the federation at that time, such as the communists, the new party group, the old party group and other groups of un-affiliated labor union supporters. In the federation we consider all wage earners equal, and we do not think this one is in my group and this one is in so and so's group. But this situation that developed recently has created numerous groups some of which wanted to work with Habib Achour against us. Actually, they wanted to eliminate us and weaken Habib Achour by dividing us and then working against Habib Achour himself. This is what I had cautioned Habib Achour about numerous times, particularly in the last session of the International Labor Office in Geneva in 1983.

[Question] When you left the General Federation, another number of members of the Executive Bureau who support you were supposed to leave with you. But that did not happen. How did you take that?

[Answer] We took that with considerable surprise and disappointment.

[Question] Was there a large number of them?

[Answer] I believe you are referring to a few individuals. Actually, a large number of the members of the Executive Office were convinced, as we were, about the existing situation--and that situation still exists. They were also convinced about existing transgressions and corruption. They knew that they were true, but they did not have enough courage to stand on the side of truth.

[Question] It's been 5 months since the decision was made to expel you from the administrative board. Also 2 months have passed since the National Federation was founded. How do you see its condition with regard to its personnel, its outreach and the number of its members? Are you satisfied with it?

[Answer] When we accepted that responsibility from supporters of the union, we accepted it on the basis of reforming the course of the union in the country. We accepted it on the basis of carrying out the proper action in the context of the higher interest of the nation. Thus the purpose of establishing that new organization was not the members who will be recruited. In other words, the purpose was not how many members we will have, but rather how will we get those members.

The matter is not whether or not we are satisfied with where we are because satisfaction is basically linked with how something is done and not with quantity. If both quantity and how something is done were linked together, that would be a welcome proposition. What we mean by how something is done is adhering to the original principles of the labor union. What we are hoping for is to have that

notion reach all agencies and all sectors. This is what happened, and this is what is happening.

[Question] How many federations and regional unions have you established so far?

[Answer] We do not place too much importance on the subject of figures, but we can count a significant number of regional unions. They are as follows: al-Qasrayn, Bajah, Bizerte, Sfax, Zaghouan, Nabeul, Kairouan, Medenine, Sidi Bouzid, Siliana, Tozeur, Gabes and others that are in the process of being organized.

Regarding the sectors we've organized numerous federations: about 10. Having that number of regional unions and sectional federations 2 months after establishing the union is significant.

The number of members cannot be determined finally, especially in the beginning when the number of members is growing every day because people are joining the union every day. So far however, we can consider the figure, 50,000 members, to be a figure that is consistent with reality.

[Question] Were most of these people members of the UGTT?

[Answer] I do not believe so.

[Question] It is being said that the National Federation is the federation that defends institutions. Is that true?

[Answer] We do not believe that labor union activity can be built on the ruins of bankrupt institutions. In fact, labor union activity can only be built on the basis of the prosperity, progress and modernization of institutions. These are the principal factors that can make a labor union member active, work and ask for improvements in his material and moral conditions. If we want to strengthen workers' purchasing power, not merely correct it, that means that workers must get their share in the development of gross revenues and in the development of the GNP--which grows as a result of the combined effort of workers, capital and services. When we strive to strengthen workers' purchasing power and improve workers, we must find ways to improve workers' wages. This can only be done by prosperous institutions. From that premise I would agree to defend simultaneously workers and the prosperity of institutions on two conditions:

--That these institutions give workers their rights;

--That they not evade taxes.

[Question] Several subjects were raised when you met the prime minister. One of them was that of restraint. What was the prime minister's response to that point?

[Answer] The government is prepared to do that in the context of administrative measures in accordance with the bulletin that was issued by the prime ministry in 1963.

[Question] It seems that the second subject has something to do with labor union representation. How do you see it?

[Answer] This subject is actually being brought up in some organizations. It is being said that we must deal with the party that has a majority. I actually wonder where did they get such a notion or such a law? Even if we were to consider the law and section 38 of the labor code, we will find that what is discussed are the common standard form contract and who signs it only. We are not now facing a common standard form contract. Nevertheless, we cannot run away from the subject. We must instead face it and try to explain it. How are we to understand the majority then? Does it mean that one has the right to go ahead and speak on behalf of all workers and wage earners when one represents 51 percent of the supporting members? Does it mean that I would not have the right to do so because I have only 49 percent, for example? Such thinking is simplistic because with 49 percent [representation] I could have enough of a constituency to speak on behalf of that segment of workers. Nevertheless, the 49 percent can become 51 percent in 1 week! Do I become at that time the one who speaks for the workers, and do you become the one who should withdraw? And so in the context of a balance of quantity things can change every month and every week. I strongly affirm that the majority legislators had in mind was not a numerical majority but rather a ratio of the constituency which is somewhat related to the numerical aspect.

[Question] From a practical standpoint, however, and amidst the current negotiations, [let me ask you] is the National Federation a party with other parties in these negotiations?

[Answer] We are asking that we be representatives wherever we are. In the textiles sector, for example, we contacted some parties who were understanding about our participation. However, there are some parties that have not yet accepted our participation. We will not remain idle in the face of this situation, and we will try to be representatives either through dialogue or by setting up ourselves as representatives by other legitimate means should that become necessary.

[Question] Do you intend to exercise your right to strike, and how do you see that coming about?

[Answer] Yes, we may resort to using our right to go on strike because that is closely connected with the right to have a labor union. We disagree with some people about how this right is to be exercised because we believe that exercising the right to strike ought to come after all the methods of dialogue have been exhausted and after all the means that can lead to a resolution of the dispute are blocked. Furthermore, that right must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of the law.

[Question] Have any strikes been declared by the National Federation?

[Answer] There was a strike in the cattle farming office in (Burj al-Nur) because the right to organize a labor union came under attack, and the secretary general and his assistant were suspended. There was also another strike at the Sotupress newspaper distribution company.

[Question] It is being said that your union is the union of the Destourian Party?

[Answer] We are a union for all workers who wish to join the National Federation. We do not discriminate between a member of the Destourian party and a member of another party.

[Question] This requires raising another question about the possibility of the union being taken over from within by political tendencies.

[Answer] This would be up to union supporters who chose to have a professional union. That could happen. If it does happen, it will be the charter of the organization that will decide every dispute.

[Question] It seems that you have been subjected to some harassment by some regional and administrative authorities. How do you explain that?

[Answer] I want to affirm this, and this question contradicts what has been and is being said by some people. It is being said that we are the union that is supported by the authorities. How then can we explain this contradiction? On the one hand we are being thwarted by the authorities, and on the other hand we are the authorities' union. The answer to that question assumes two matters: we are either subordinate to the authorities, and that is not relevant at all; or there are two sources of power in the country, and this is something I do not want to acknowledge at all because it is a serious matter. But it is evidence of the fact that we are not affiliated with any party. In fact, we are asking everybody to be completely neutral with us despite the difficulties to which we have been subjected ever since the organization was established. The situation here is the same as the case of the colleague Abderrazak Ghorbal. The prime minister took this case into consideration, and he gave instructions that the matter be investigated, and this was done later. Besides, there have been unusual actions that I can explain by two factors. [The first factor is that] the first existing union was afraid, particularly since some leaders who are general directors are not accustomed to having two organizations; nor are they accustomed to the possible effects of supporting the recent organization or dealing with it in the context of the law.

[The second factor is that] some people may have a personal preference for some officials in the first union or outside it, or they may be able to get in touch with those officials. This makes them refrain from dealing with the second union even in the context of the law, and they may even oppose it. This is what happened to us in some organizations and with some regional authorities which did not have any instructions from government. We were assured by the government and by the prime minister himself, that the authorities recognized our existence legally because the law stipulates that and because his excellency the president had received us. That is considered legal and political recognition of our organization. Besides, our organization does in fact exist on the scene.

[Question] In the first days after your organization was founded, the opposition's posture toward you was one of active opposition. That opposition has gradually waned, and now there is silence. Why was that posture assumed against you, and why is that silence? Are contacts being made between you and the opposition?

[Answer] This matter was not brought to the attention of the Executive Bureau even though we did observe at the outset the hostile posture of the opposition toward us. Recently they have been quiet. We did not try to explain the two phenomena because the opposition is free to judge against us or for us. We respect their positions, but we are not bound by them. We are obligated only to our labor union supporters.

[Question] How would you envision methods of coordination and cooperation between the two existing labor union organizations?

[Answer] This question cannot be answered because this matter can only be decided by supporters. Members of some labor union organizations may streamline their positions because of real common labor union demands. With regard to labor union organizations, I believe that such an assumption cannot be predicted.

[Question] It is being said that the experience of the National Federation may become like that of the Tunisian Federation of Labor in 1956: in other words, going back to one organization. Is this relevant or not to the situation we are in at the present time?

[Answer] The fact that we have a National Federation is not the result of a dispute between individuals, but it is rather the result of a departure from a democratic and a labor union course. The question today is that of reforming the course of a union which is entrusted to men who are not in the Executive Bureau but who are union supporters. If that assumption holds, then neither Abdelaziz Bouraoui nor the Executive Bureau can answer that question. Only union supporters who established this union can.

[Question] Are you saying that the two organizations may merge into one if union supporters find that to be possible?

[Answer] It is union supporters who will decide what they think is suitable. It is not my place to predict what they will do. They are the ones who have the right to resolve this matter, if in future generations they find themselves facing this situation. At the present time, we have been charged by supporters to correct the course of the labor union which had been deflected. That's all.

8592

CSO: 4504/260

REPORT OF INQUIRY COMMISSION OF JANUARY DISTURBANCES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 19, 20 Apr 84

[19 Apr 84 p 5]

[Text] Starting today, we are publishing in full the report of the Commission of Inquiry on the disturbances of 3 January 1984 (translated by our editorial staff).

At the Cabinet meeting of 10 January 1984, chaired by the Supreme Combatant, Habib Bourguiba, it was decided to constitute a commission of inquiry to assess responsibilities and shed light on the hidden side of the painful events that took place on 3 January 1984 in Tunis. In accordance with Decree No 22/84 of 15 January 1984 providing for the creation and composition of said commission, as follows: Messrs Mohamed Ridha Ben Ali, director of public prosecution at the Supreme Court of Appeal: president; Hamed El Abed, legal and legislative consultant to the government, Abdelkrim Azaiez, governor of Ben Arous, representing the Ministry of Interior, Col Ammar El Khriji, representing the Ministry of National Defense: members;

And in accordance with article 2 of the above-mentioned decree, ordering that the commission be provided with all means required to carry out its mission and indicating that the commission shall submit the result of its work to the President of the Republic;

In submitting this report, the commission expresses its wholehearted gratitude for the trust with which the Supreme Combatant has honored it. Before submitting the body of its report, the commission would like to outline in a preamble the lawfulness of the commission and its work, thus placing things in their proper context and exhausting any questions of a legal nature that could be open to controversy.

As defined in the Constitution, the regime rests on democracy, and its mainstay is the people's sovereignty which expresses itself through a politically stable regime. This regime is ruled according to the principle of separation of powers, under which the President of the Republic is the chief of the executive power. Indeed, it is the president's responsibility to guarantee that the country remains independent, that the Constitution is respected and the law obeyed. Therefore, he is the guarantor of the State's durability (see articles 37, 38, 41 and 53 of the Tunisian Constitution). Under article 53,

he has the right to see to it that law and order are maintained and that the administration is run efficiently, and to do so he does not need any special authorization from the legislative power. Therefore, he is in a position to take any regulatory steps required in any domain not covered by the Constitution and not falling within the province of the legislative power.

The constitution of commissions, which is essentially an administrative task, and the definition of their responsibilities fall precisely into the category of regulatory steps covered by article 53.

Therefore, the Supreme Combatant's decision to constitute this commission of inquiry was sound and based on principles recognized in the Constitution.

Starting from these basic principles, the commission started its work on 7 January, making full use of the powers recognized to it by article 3 of the decree mentioned earlier. It held meetings at the Supreme Court of Appeal, as this institution is a symbol of impartiality and legitimacy.

It heard all those who could contribute to establish the truth: ministers, secretaries of state, high officials and citizens from all classes who came forward on their own to testify on what they saw or heard on the territory of the Republic on 3 January 1984 and on the days before and after that date.

To ensure that the commission could work under the best possible conditions and in accordance with the objectives it had set for itself to establish the truth, we, its members, decided that our meetings would be confidential and that all witnesses would be guaranteed secrecy. Our concern was to make sure that they would not be subjected to any direct or indirect pressure. We also made sure that witnesses were heard under oath and signed their testimonies to give the latter the required credibility. This approach was of a nature to awaken in them the fear of God if they had distorted facts or made a mistake or, again, if they had willfully concealed the truth. As we already said, the mission of the commission as defined in the above-mentioned decree was to carry out the inquiry, i.e. to go as far as possible in examining the facts and barbaric actions of the demonstrators in certain governorates in the country, especially in Tunis, on 3 January 1984. These actions were committed against citizens and their property as well as against public and private institutions.

During the inquiry, we received reports and documents recounting misdeeds committed by some officials of the Ministry of Interior.

We thought it advisable to mention this in our report, although by way of digression only and without dwelling too much on it, as this report does not lend itself to that.

We shall leave it up to the government to take the steps it shall deem necessary, should this contribute to providing convincing proofs against the former officials in question.

Also, during this inquiry, we heard conflicting versions of the facts. Considering that these conflicting versions have disclosed important facts that

could lead to proofs, we shall use the assessment criteria commonly used in Tunisian courts, in spite of the fact that our inquiry is not tied to any legal or penal provisions that could contribute to an indictment... This commission being one of these political devices intended to remove any danger that would threaten the security of the country or endanger society.

In our assessment of facts, we have dismissed anything that was doubtful, taking into account only that on which all versions or visions agreed.

As a result, our analyses are based on all of the above-mentioned basic principles. That enabled us to examine all the data and questionable details having to do with the events of 3 January 1984. Our constant concerns were impartiality and objectivity. We drew our conclusions from the facts recorded in this report, without adding or deleting anything whatsoever from them.

This enabled us to define responsibilities and make recommendations, which shall be presented in the second part of this report.

Before recounting the facts as they happened, we would like to point out that we sent a summons to Mr Idriss Guiga, to appear in front of the Commission on 7 February 1984. It was addressed to his residence in Carthage. His son Moncef acknowledged receipt of it. As this report is being written, Mr Idriss Guiga has not yet appeared.

Finally, we wish to express our respect and thanks to all those who helped us fulfill our mission. We should also not forget all the national institutions and authorities which did not hesitate to give us unsparingly all that we needed. The contributions thus made to our deliberations have enriched this report.

Statements from individuals heard by the commission:

- No 1: Statement by Mr Ameer Ghedira, secretary of state at the Ministry of Interior;
- No 2: Statement by Mr Abedlhamid Skhiri, general director of the National Police;
- No 3: Statement by Mr Ezzeddine Driss, prefect of police of the Tunis district;
- No 4: Statement by Mr Tahar Sraieb, head of Mr Driss Guiga's staff;
- No 5: Statement by Mr Nouredine Fourati, general secretary at the Ministry of Interior;
- No 6: Statement by Mr Mokhtar Rassaa, press attache at the Ministry of Interior;
- No 7: Statement by Mr Mohamed Ajlani, chief commissioner and director of studies at the Prefecture of Police;

- No 8: Statement by Mr Nejib Bouderbala, head of the control room of the National Police;
- No 9: Statement by Mr Fethi Dakhli, officer of the National Police;
- No 10: Statement by Mr Ali Zouari, officer of the National Police;
- No 11: Statement by Mr Ezzeddine Jnayeh, chief police commissioner;
- No 12: Statement by Mr Mouldi Samaid, assistant director of the Public Order Brigades;
- No 13: Statement by Mr Chedli Nefzaoui, high commissioner, director of the criminal police;
- No 14: Statement by Mr Taieb Ben Mohamed Essid, high police commissioner and director of State Security and coordinateur at the directorate of the National Police;
- No 15: Statement by Mr Salah Ben Halima, acting assistant director at the intelligence department;
- No 16: Statement by Mr Jameleddine Guiza, police commissioner, head of the equipment department of the National Police;
- No 17: Statement by Mr Ezzeddine Ounissi, representative of El-Hrairia, in Tunis;
- No 18: Statement by Mr Bechir Ayadi, representative of Bab Souika;
- No 19: Statement by Mr Ahmed El-Hajji, police officer at the Public Order Brigades;
- No 20: Statement by Mr Bechir El-Mhirsi, chief of police district in Gafsa;
- No 21: Statement by Mr Sghaier El-Azouzi, chief of police district in Kasserine;
- No 22: Statement by Mr Rabah Ben Mohamed El-Grami, employed at the National Automobile Clud;
- No 23: Statement by Mr Mohamed Ali El Kanzoui, head commissioner at the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance;
- No 24: Statement by Mr Ahmed Ben Mohamed El-Missaoui, lieutenant in the Public Order Brigades;
- No 25: Statement by Mr Taoufik Dabbabi, commanding the 11th brigade of the 3rd battalion of the police;
- No 26: Statement by Mr Mohamed Ben Chedli Cherif, a resident of Bab Souika;

- No 27: Statement by Mr Abdelkrim Essanaa, head of the Bab Souika station;
- No 28: Statement by Mr Belhassen Ben Mohamed Lahmar, vice-mayor of Manouba;
- No 29: Statement by Mr Habib Dakhlaoui, head of the Jdaïda police station;
- No 30: Statement by Mr Azaiez Daboussi, head of the Bab Souika police district;
- No 31: Statement by Mr Majid El-Khemiri, captain, head of the police-gathering station of Mohammed V, placed under the authority of the prefecture of police;
- No 32: Statement by Mr Mohamed Ben Zid, police inspector at the Bab Souika police station;
- No 33: Statement by Mr Boubaker Ben Kraïem at the Ministry of National Defense;
- No 34: Statement by Mr Ahmed Jaouadi, head of the La Goulette police station;
- No 35: Statement by Mr Moncef Bouabid, director of administrative affairs at the Tunisian Land and Trade Credit Bank;
- No 36: Statement by Mr Mohamed Masmoudi, chief executive officer of the National Small Trade and Crafts Office;
- No 37: Statement by Mr Mohamed Habib El Gharbi, governor of Gabes;
- No 38: Statement by Dr Bechir Maknini, professor at the Tunis Faculty of Medicine;
- No 39: Statement by Mr Mohamed Tahar Jaziri, jeweller;
- No 40: Statement by Mr Ahmed Bennour, secretary of state to national security;
- No 41: Statement by Mr Mohamed Ben Mahmoud Kraïem, government administrator in the Tunis governorate;
- No 42: Statement by Mr Frej Chedli, minister of national education;
- No 43: Statement by Mr Slaheddine Baly, minister of national defense;
- No 44: Statement by Mr Hedi Belhaj, hajeb [as published] at the Ministry of National Education;
- No 45: Statement by Mr Hechmi Charfeddine, teacher, administrative assistant to the minister of national education;

- No 46: Statement by Mr Ababa El Kefi, lawyer;
- No 47: Statement by Mr Mohamed Azzouin Ben Bechir Toumi Dridi, head of police station, police secretary at the Crime Brigade;
- No 48: Statement by Mr Mohamed Ben Hassen Ben Khelifa, owner of the Maamoun Hotel in Gafsa;
- No 49: Statement by Dr Sadok Kaiji, professor at the Tunis Faculty of Medicine;
- No 50: Statement by Major Mounir Abdallah, commanding the intervention and border battalion of the National Guard;
- No 51: Statement by Mr Abdellatif Dahmani, chief executive officer of the National Transport Company;
- No 52: Statement by Mr Abdelaziz Tabka, general police commissioner at the Directorate of National Security;
- No 53: Statement by Mr Hamadi Khouini, governor of Tunis;
- No 54: Statement of Mr Abdelhafidh Tounsi, head of the Sfax police district;
- No 55: Statement by Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister;
- No 56: Statement by Mr Mongi Kooli, minister delegate to the prime minister, director of the Destourian Socialist Party.

The Facts

Late in December 1983, the government decided to abolish CGC [expansion unknown] subsidies to cereal and cereal products. As a result, the prices of flour, pasta and bread increased.

Then, demonstrations took place in Douz (Kebili governorate) on Thursday 29 December 1983. At first, these demonstrations were sound, calling for the repeal of the measures taken. Soon, the situation took a turn for the worse.

The demonstrations turned into bloody incidents. Similar incidents also took place in Sbeitla (Kasserine governorate). The demonstrators protested the measures taken. These incidents took place when a citizen--the chairman of a cell--went to buy a sack of flour. The merchant reminded him that the price of a sack of flour had increased from 12.25 to 25 dinars. The customer left in a huff. He followed the main street, where the weekly market was going on. Many citizens joined him, calling like him for a decrease in cereal and cereal product prices. Other demonstrations took place in Kebili on Friday 30 December 1983.

Demonstrations were organized by the people of El Hamma (Gabes governorate) on Saturday 31 December 1983. Immediately after that, everything was quiet

in the village and the surrounding area. The authorities managed to restore order. However, on the evening of Saturday 31 December 1983, a group of young people from Teboulbou--near Gabes--threw stones at cars that were driving through and set fire to tires, making barricades on the GP1 highway. Police forces intervened and restored order. But things then took a new turn.

The incident that sparked off the events took place in Gafsa around 5:30 pm on Sunday 1 January 1984. A march was organized by the local section of the League of Human Rights. Its destination was the governorate seat, then the offices of Thabet, the lawyer who led the march. During their march, the demonstrators were shouting slogans against the measures abolishing the subsidies on cereals and cereal products. Soon, the march was over without having disturbed public order in the least. Soon after this demonstration had broken up, another march was organized. The demonstrators then broke shop windows and set fire to two vehicles belonging to the administration. In the end, the march broke up.

Right after these incidents, the control room of the National Police, which was under the direct responsibility of Mr Abdelhamid Skhiri, was informed of the dangerous events that were to take place in Gafsa on Monday 2 January 1984. The same day, the governor of the region phoned the Ministry of Interior to ask for reinforcements. He had been promised three armored vehicles and close to 50 BIG [expansion unknown] agents. This force arrived in Gafsa, coming from Kebili, around 3 am on Monday 2 January 1984, exhausted and provided with only a limited quantity of ammunition. This was to hinder it in its action. Early on 2 January 1984, young people gathered in small groups in the various neighborhoods of the town.

These small groups then coalesced and headed for the governorate seat.

Then, they turned back and scattered through the streets, plundering shops and setting fire to public and private buildings on their way, but police forces were unable to confront them. For these were completely exhausted and already without ammunition at 11 am. The armored vehicles stopped. This encouraged the demonstrators, whose numbers increased, to go on plundering and burning. Some of them set siege to the police station and tried to storm it, pelting it with stones. The policemen then used their weapons to break the stranglehold. Two citizens were hit by bullets. One of them died. Order was restored only in the afternoon, when troops moved in.

Prior to that, the chief of the police district was contacted by Mr Abdelhamid Skhiri who ordered him to disarm the police and store the weapons at the seat of the police district.

In Kasserine, the incidents were triggered around 10:30 am on Sunday 1 January 1984, when a demonstration started after it was announced that subsidies were abolished and suppliers refused to distribute flour, and when the price of bread rose to 170 millimes. Slogans against the regime were shouted. The ranks of the demonstrators were swelling rapidly. Students and unemployed people joined the demonstration. Shop windows were broken. Policemen scattered the demonstrators. They were hardly scattered when they gathered again.

They attacked the civilian jail with stones, iron chains and slingshots. They wanted to free the prisoners. Other groups set fire to the technical-police headquarters and to several shops and many cars.

Policemen fired on the demonstrators, killing 5 and wounding 11. Twelve policemen were wounded. Order was restored only when the army came out of its barracks.

In Feriana, incidents started at 11 am the same day. Government buildings were attacked, as well as private property and police cars.

Because they were few, the policemen fired on the rioters. There was one dead and two wounded.

In Thala, the scenario was the same. Except that the incidents were more violent. Indeed, several public and private buildings were set on fire. The police and the National Guard were unable to meet the rising flow of demonstrators--close to 5,000 people--although they fired at them. By then, the police had used up all their tear-gas bombs.

Order was restored only after the army moved in on the village squares.

The chief of the Kasserine police district, who had been appointed to that position in September 1983, asked for additional police forces, ammunition and transport vehicles. He did not get the reinforcements he had asked for.

In Gabes, on Monday 2 January 1984, the people organized a march and headed for industrial facilities from which close to 500 workers were coming. They demonstrated against the measures that had been taken.

Mr Habib Guiza, general secretary of the regional UCTT [General Union of Tunisian Workers], acting in agreement with the governor of the region tried to contain this tidal wave so the march would not lead to excesses. But soon the march had become a demonstration against the regime. It was scattered. The demonstrators gathered again. Masked individuals, some of which were on motor bikes, took over the leadership. As soon as the flow reached the main street, leading to the governorate seat, the automatic switchboard building, the Law Courts and the Small Trades and Crafts Center were attacked and set on fire. The demonstrators also attacked model shops. Despite police efforts, disorder continued until the army had left its barracks to occupy the town squares.

Following the events that took place in the center and south of the country, after the measures abolishing subsidies on cereals and cereal products had come into force, and in a climate obscured by clouds and tensions, the Ministry of the Interior--i.e. its highest officials, the minister and the command centers--were informed, already on Monday 2 January 1984, of what would happen the next day in the capital. What was going to happen promised to be serious.

Yet, when that day came, things followed their normal course, and no special provisions of any kind had been taken. Police forces were not placed in a state of maximum alert, as had been done in the past under less serious circumstances, for instance to watch stadiums during games.

That day, only government buildings and economic facilities were guarded by units of the National Army.

That day, too, the absence of the minister of the interior was noticeable. Indeed, the minister left his office around 10 am. He merely phoned in, from his home or from his car, to remind that Mr Ahmed Bennour, secretary of state to national security, who replaced him in his absence, should be contacted in case of need.

The Events of 3 January 1984 in the Capital

In this atmosphere full of tensions, an explosion that obscured the sky occurred early on Tuesday 3 January. It was to be a disaster.

Things were to happen all at once. The students held a stormy general assembly on the university campus and decided to organize a march to protest, they said, the "policy aimed at starving the working masses," condemning on the same occasion the policy of the government which they said was impopular, antipatriotic and partisan. They insisted that price increases were unacceptable and inhuman. According to them, it revealed all the hideousness of the present regime. After that, they organized a demonstration that marched through the streets of the capital. Before that, they could not agree on the time when it should start. Some wanted it to take place at 10 am, to enable high-school students to join them. Others felt that a later hour-- 12 or 12:30--would enable workers and civil servants to join it.

The control room, placed under the authority of the prefecture of police and under the responsibility of Mr Fethi Dakhli, was informed of what happened at the general assembly and of the events that were to follow.

It was advised that a number of students intended to demonstrate at noon and would first gather on Barcelona Square.

As expected, violent and bloody incidents took place that day in the capital.

Before noon, demonstrators started simultaneously from the Habib Thameur garden and the Bab El Khadhra station. The two waves met on Bab El Khadhra Street and headed together toward Mongi Slim Street, Place de la Monnaie and Paris Avenue. Then, the demonstrators broke up into huge groups that headed in various directions. The wave covered all of the Medina districts and the remaining town. Stores were looted, public buildings devastated and cars set on fire. The confusion extended to nearby suburban areas. Many police stations, delegation and community seats were attacked. Certain bank branch offices and public transport vehicles were not spared.

The police forces moved in. But, lacking a well-designed plan of intervention and being unprepared, they failed in all their efforts to meet the rioters.

Police forces were outflanked and lost control of the situation for hours. Meanwhile, the demonstrators and those who had infiltrated them (delinquents, thieves, suspicious characters and ex-convicts and other anarchists) did

not hesitate to lay their hands on property and individuals, plundering and burning. Calls for help from official and other circles remained unheeded and nothing was done.

Before considering the part played by each of the officials in charge of security, Messrs Driss Guiga, Ahmed Bennour, Ameer Ghedira, Abdelhamid Skhiri and Ezzeddine Driss, during these incidents, especially those of 3 January 1984 in Tunis, and what happened thereafter, and to set these events in their context, we should recall, even briefly, the general and psychological climate that prevailed then at the Ministry of Interior and in the security apparatus as a whole.

The General Climate at the Ministry of Interior

Based on testimony we received from people who held positions in this ministry or in the apparatus operating in the field, it appears that the climate was not one of confidence and peace.

The fact that, suddenly and without preparation, the apparatus had been divided and the intervention units placed under two directorates--the Directorate of National Security, the Directorate of National Police--and the prefecture of police--accounted to some extent for these conditions. Because it paralyzed the police forces. The effects could be noticed in the orders given, which were often conflicting, not to mention the permanent conflict opposing Messrs Abdelhamid Skhiri and Ezzeddine Driss. That conflict was due to the fact that each of them wanted to extend his power at any cost to serve his own interests, as we shall see in exhaustive detail later. The former saw the creation of the prefecture of police as a narrowing of his field of power. Even though he provided another explanation that could be justified. His explanation is that Mr Guiga wanted to politicize the prefecture of police and place it under his direct control by having one of his supporters at its head. Whereas the latter believed he was better qualified to be placed in charge of the capital's security.

This division into several apparatuses contributed to discourage those who were competent and attracted supporters and those who paid allegiance. The result was that a tense and suspicious climate prevailed in the various circles in charge of security. Some withdrew into themselves; others became indifferent to matters of security, showed no initiative. Others turned their back on serious issues. This made the situation more difficult.

This second category did not stop at that. They did not hesitate to attack moral values, to abuse the power entrusted to them, the better to serve their own interests.

We discovered that Mr Driss Guiga had at his disposal four cars of various makes. The same was true of Mr Abdelhamid Skhiri who had nine cars at his disposal, including four BMW. As for private secretaries, they had three cars at their disposal. He used his position as a springboard to associate himself with delinquents, ex-convicts and suspicious characters. He made it easier for them to come here and stay, and in exchange he obtained material benefits from them.

He also used some of his staff members to carry drugs from a European country to Paris.

To remove all obstacles, he appointed his hirelings to key positions such as the airport, the port. He appointed his brother-in-law, who had no experience, head of the technical police. For money, he would give to anyone who wanted one, certificates stating they had no criminal records. He was thus potentially endangering--and to what extent!--the very structure of society.

He is said to have assets abroad. He also appointed men in his service to head the various structures for which he was responsible. All these people used their offices to extort money and exploit those working under them. Some would receive large salaries from bar and brothel owners. Even the Ministry of Interior was not spared. The scourge pervaded all levels. So much so that good people, honest civil servants, were forced to withdraw into themselves.

[20 Apr 84, pp 6, 7]

[Text] We are publishing today the second part of the report of the Commission of Inquiry on the events of 3 January 1984.

In the first part, published yesterday in the issue dated Thursday 19 April 1984, the report mentioned the conditions under which the commission was established, gave the list of the people that were heard, and reviewed how the events were triggered in the south of the country... as well as the general climate prevailing at the Ministry of Interior before and during these events.

Here is the end of the report.

As for Mr Driss Guiga, he surrounded himself with associates with whom he was quite generous. The following table is evidence of that fact:

| <u>Last and First Names</u> | <u>Position</u> | <u>Amounts (Dinars)</u> | <u>Remarks</u> |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Bechir Fathallah | Mission delegate to the minister | 100 | Being given 150 dinars, asked to have the amount reduced to 100 dinars. The minister gave him 150 dinars. |
| Khaled Chlaiefa | Mission delegate | 100 | Per month |
| Hichem B. Mahmoud | Staff member | 100 | Per month |
| Erraied Laribi | Mission delegate | 150 | Per month |
| Noureddine El-Alaoui | Mission delegate | 150 | Per month |

| <u>Last and First Names</u> | <u>Position</u> | <u>Amounts (Dinars)</u> | <u>Remarks</u> |
|-----------------------------|---|-----------------------------|--|
| Mongi Belhassine | High commissioner | 70 | The former minister ordered Mr Sraieb to give him 100. |
| Mokhtar Rassaa | Press attache | 150 | Per month |
| Mohamed Drissi | Head of the former minister's secretariat | 80 | Per month |
| Ammar Bouhjar | Administrative assistant | 20 | Per month |
| Med Mansour Ammar | Hajeb of the staff director | 15 | Per month |
| Cherif Saidani | Hajeb of the staff director | 15 | Per month |
| Mohamed Ammar | Hajeb in the minister's staff | 15 | Per month |
| Mohamed Boughzela | Hajeb of the minister | 15 | Per month |
| Tahar Sraieb | Staff director | - | Stated he had been receiving 2,000 dinars per month, to be distributed |
| Noureddine Fourati | General secretary | 300 | Per month |
| Abdelhak Lassoued | Director of regional administration | 200 | Only twice |
| Abbes Mohsen | Director of local communities | 300 | Per month |
| Abbes Mohsen | Director of RG [expansion unknown] | 100 | Per month |
| Amor Chechia | Director of penal services | - | Amount unknown. Was given from hand to hand. |
| Hamadi Khouini | Governor of Tunis | - | Amount unknown. Once. |
| Houcine Boussoffara | General commissioner | Between 200 and 300 | Per month |
| Amor Mabrouk | Motorcycle escort | 15 | Per month |
| Mohamed Troudi | Administrative assistant | 20 | Per month |
| Aissa El Bayani | Associate of the minister | 20 | Per month |
| Abdallah El Kebir | Associate of the minister | 20 | Per month |
| Laroussi Boujnah | Chauffeur of the minister's wife | 20 | Per month |
| Abdelkader Hamida | Chauffeur of the minister | 20 | Paid back to technical services. |
| Lakhdar Dridi | Chauffeur of the minister | 20 | Per month |
| Amor Chechia | Director of penal services | 100 | Per month |
| Mahmoud Chtourou | Director of administrative police | 150 | Per month. Through the prefecture. |

As a minister, Driss Guiga had 54 cars of various makes at his disposal; he distributed them indiscriminately to his supporters; one of them, who had a shady past, had 6 cars; another one, a policeman who had lost his job because he had started a gambling club, was reinstated by Driss Guiga who also promoted him; others, mere policemen or municipal agents, were appointed delegates. Meanwhile, tens of graduates of the Faculty of Law and the National School of Administration, who were better qualified for these positions of responsibility, were out on the streets looking for jobs. The former minister acted as if he wanted to cause discontent and resentment among the young and among civil servants, without realizing that his attitude could throw the very structure of the State back into question. As examples, we should mention the following cases:

1. Larbi Guiga: formerly a policeman. Education: 5th year of high school. Title: technical police inspector. Appointed delegate to Sidi Bou Ali on 1 November 1980.
2. Mohamed El Hedi El Oueslati: in charge of equipment at the Tunis town hall. Education: 6th year of high school (management). Appointed delegate to Bizerte-North on 1 November 1980.
3. Ezzeddine El Ounissi: security agent; sargeant in the public order force. Education: 1st part of the tahcil diploma (the equivalent of the former Arab high-school certificate). Appointed delegate in 1982 and sent to El Hrairia, in the Tunis governorate.
4. Mohamed Ridha Driss: administrative secretary at the Tunis town hall, then administrator of a municipal district. Education: tahcil in sciences. In January 1981, was appointed delegate to Mateur, then to Hammam-Lif, and now in El Mohammedia. Reports indicate that, with the complicity of a few omdas in Hammam-Lif, he misappropriated 3,028 dinars on the occasion of the last pilgrimage.

He had collected the money from the pilgrims, making them believe that it would be paid to the regional office of the Social Solidarity Fund. Only 22.492 dinars were recovered in a bank account at the Bank of Tunisia.

5. Abdelaziz Ben Mohamed Belhaj. Education: El Ahlia diploma. Technical police inspector dismissed by the Honor Council. Driss Guiga ordered his case reexamined, repealed the decision and reinstated him.
6. Mohsen Ezzine: municipal agent of Class 10. Education: 3rd year of high school. Was appointed delegate of El Omrane Superieur in September 1980.

All the above are unconditional supporters of Driss Guiga and Ezzeddine Driss.

On 24 September 1983, through the Director of Public Organizations, Driss Guiga sent to all governors a circular letter, No 2205, inviting them to contribute to the expenses incurred by the President of the Republic during his stay in the Jerid region, in amounts of 2,500 dinars to be accounted

for under article 7/40 concerning entertainment expenditures. The former minister insisted that his instructions be carried out and asked that these amounts be placed at the disposal of the Tozeur governor. This behavior is typical of the abuses practiced by Driss Guiga and his associates; it is typical of the waste that prevails within the ministry and of the abuses that led him to make decisions contrary to administrative procedures and of a nature to undermine the State's authority and the dignity of the President of the Republic.

As for the contract he signed for shields, it deserves being mentioned.

Early in 1980, Saudi Arabia had given 10 million dollars to Tunisia to improve the equipment of the Tunisian security forces, National Guard and Police. An invitation to tender was issued through the press on 23-24-25 May 1980, indicating that the Ministry of Interior intended to purchase transport vehicles. The specifications included a non-descriptive list of equipment, including armed armored vehicles. The successful tenderers included, in order of priority, a French and a Spanish supplier. However, at the request of the Ministry of Interior, a Brazilian supplier was added to the list, although the technical commission had recommended against him. The Brazilian supplier was then placed at the head of the preferential list. The services in charge justified this choice by the fact that the supplier had all the equipment available and that his prices were competitive. Thus, he was considered not because of the technical study, but because he was recommended and chosen by Ezzeddine Driss (then Driss Guiga's director of staff) and in spite of the fact that the higher commission had rejected his tender.

That choice was submitted a second time, on 26 May 1981, to the higher commission on tenders, which was advised to approve the choice, as this was urgent business. Actually, the recommendation was made only to regularize the transaction that had already been concluded on 21 January 1981 and completed by the former minister. Indeed, the Brazilian representative would often call on the minister at his office to negotiate the deal with him in private.

Therefore, it is evident that this transaction was concluded under conditions that are closer to direct agreement than to the provisions regulating invitations to tender that should be followed in such cases. The circumstances under which the transaction was concluded are not clear and of doubtful impartiality, and its honesty is therefore questionable. (In this respect, review the documents issued by the public expenditure control services and the report submitted by Major Mounir Abdallah).

Working Methods and Passive Role of the Tunis Prefecture of Police

Attention was focussed on the events that took place on the territory of the Republic toward the end of 1983, just as it was focussed on what might happen in the capital. The general feeling was that troubles could occur, or that at least something was in sight.

This is all the more natural, as the capital is the center of all cultural, social and political activities. It is also the center of power, the place

where constitutional and national institutions have their seats. It is also a crossroads of intellectual and political currents. Because of that, Tunis was likely to be the scene of troubles or incidents, considering what had happened inland.

Because of all that, it was the responsibility of the highest official in charge of the country's security to be aware of what could happen and to take preventive measures to safeguard peace among the citizens. And although all was quiet on Monday 2 January 1984, an examination of Driss Guiga's agenda showed that he had left his office at 10 am and never came back, although circumstances required his presence. His political and national responsibilities required that he be available so as to face any event that could lead to a breach of the peace.

His defection caused uncertainty and hesitation among the commands and directorates involved. The latter had also failed to prepare themselves to deal effectively with anything that might happen, although steps had been taken on other, less serious occasions. A sign of the former minister's indifference is that he left no instruction to implement the intervention plan which had been prepared and was found in a confidential envelope in his desk. The plan provided for intervention in three stages, and for means to gain control of access points and strategic arteries in the town, should disturbances--like those which took place--ever occur.

As a result, when incidents started on 3 January, citizens wondered whether there were security forces in the capital to protect them.

It was a dark day, such as Tunisia never experienced before in its history. The capital was in the hands of the anarchists who gained control of the streets with stones and iron bars. Tunis was the scene of their devastations, plundering and burning. Order was conspicuously lacking. Ezzeddine Driss, prefect of Tunis, was to state that he had accepted this position unwillingly, at Driss Guiga's insistence. Indeed, he explained, he was not psychologically prepared for this position, which was not to his liking and for which he was not suited.

Thus, neither Ezzeddine Driss nor the services under him had prepared a security plan to deal with the events, although this had been routinely done, and for minor events such as sport competitions.

The policemen were ill prepared for these events and were armed with clubs, as their weapons had been taken away. That led them to believe that all they would have to deal with would be students' demonstrations. Also, tear-gas bombs had not been issued in sufficient amounts, although entire stocks were found to be in inventory after the events, and estimated at close to 6,000 unused bombs. Policemen received strict orders prohibiting them from using their personal weapons, even in cases covered by law No 4 of 24 January 1979 concerning demonstrations and rallies. In addition, many policemen were ordered to stay in barracks and police stations, and were not involved in maintaining order. Some 400-500 policemen were on leave and were not recalled. For instance, the district chief and the police station chief of Bab Souika, and those of the Halfaouine and El Hafsia stations

were on leave simultaneously and were not recalled in spite of the difficult conditions prevailing in the capital. The Bab Souika district chief offered to return to his post but was told that no instructions had been issued to that effect.

The disturbances continued and no dissuasive intervention took place, so that the main arteries and squares were practically deserted by police forces, except for their transport vehicles that went by quickly or whose presence was passive and symbolic. This situation was to arouse fear within the police forces, and certain policemen had vivid exchanges with those in charge of the control room concerning the latter's failure to send reinforcements in spite of repeated calls.

Tapes recorded on the FM band by many citizens who were listening to communications with the Ministry of Interior, show that when one unit asked for reinforcements or instructions it was told that help was on the way and it should resist and wait for its arrival. As for the instructions, they were ambiguous and not clear.

Thus, policemen and agents of the Tunis prefecture asked insistently for reinforcements in men and ammunition, clearly indicating their inability to cope with the wave of violence that was sweeping through the town. Their calls sounded nearly desperate, but they were not answered.

Therefore, it became clear that the lack of organization and coordination in moving the units about, and the fact that the instructions given to them were sketchy, were the cause of the ineffectiveness of their interventions.

Technically, the ineffectiveness of communications between units and the control room was clear, as policemen lacked experience in this field, which resulted in a sort of communication cacophony.

Besides, the mere fact that citizens could intercept confidential communications from the Ministry of Interior with ordinary radio sets, and thus could give conflicting and imaginary instructions, shows that jamming equipment to ensure secrecy was lacking. This, too, could have repercussions on police morale. Therefore, the incompetence of the control room is clear. So much so that Mr Ezzeddine Jenayeh, in charge of the security of the capital, announced already during the first hours that the police forces, which were Mr Ezzeddine Driss's responsibility, were unable to do their job right. He advised the latter and told him he had no control over what was happening. We do not believe that Driss read the situation to Driss Guiga, who spent the whole day at his office, to follow closely the events, as he was the highest official in charge of the country's security. Indeed, the matter is too serious for Ezzeddine Driss to take full responsibility, all the more so as he was appointed by Driss Guiga, out of trust, as the latter wanted to be kept informed of anything that happened in the capital, in order to remain in control should that become necessary. This confirms the opinion put forward as to Driss Guiga's objective of politicizing the prefecture of Tunis and gaining control of its structures through the people he appointed to key positions.

After our research and conclusions on the events of 3 January and on the responsibility of those involved in them, we shall now consider the part played by the General Directorate of National Security, headed by Abdelhamid Skhiri, and the efforts made to preserve the capital.

The Part Played By Public Order Brigades In the Capital on 3 January 1984

No one will imagine that the security forces, and especially the public order brigades--which were placed directly under Abdelhamid Skhiri--were not informed of the bloody events that took place in the various governorates of the Republic, at Kebili, Kasserine, El-Hamma, Gabes and Gafsa, and of the resulting human and material losses. It was inconceivable that the capital, the seat of the State sovereignty, should not be affected by the shockwave of disturbances.

Based on this and on reports from intelligence services, it was the duty of the general director of security to take the measures necessary to protect the capital.

Even if the directorate had not been informed that 3 January would be marked by disturbances, all policemen would have been made aware that there was an emergency by the incidents that started in the evening of Monday 2 January 1984 in Ras Tabia, the Bardo and around the university halls of residence, during which students used stones, bars and started fires until 2 am, as was reported by Captain Ali Zouari. It was undeniable that these incidents would continue the next day.

As the situation was deteriorating, it was Abdelhamid Skhiri's duty to hold a meeting, as he was used to, to develop a security plan in cooperation with the services involved, including the Tunis prefecture. He should have considered all possible situations, inspected the transmission equipment, the police equipment and ammunition, and given adequate instructions. But nothing of the sort was done.

In spite of the incidents that had been occurring throughout the country since 29 December 1983, the directorate did not decree that police forces should be placed in a state of alert, nor did it order mobilization and the suspension of all leaves of absence.

A blatant breach of duty was taking place according to some associates of the general director, so that the presence of police forces was formal and ineffective, all the more so as police officers were told that the former minister of interior had given instructions that policemen should confront the demonstrators without weapons and that, in addition, strict orders were given not to use weapons, even to shoot in the air, unless instructions to do so were received from Abdelhamid Skhiri himself.

As for the control rooms--the brains of any security apparatus--they were in a state of total neglect, worse than in 1980. The equipment designed to enable the services involved to follow on photos and films the movements of the demonstrators at strategic locations--university campus, Habib Bourguiba Avenue, Kasbah Square, etc.--had broken down a long time ago.

Only four governorates (Tunis, Zaghouan, Nabeul and Monastir) were covered by wireless communications, and contact was made through the regular telephone line, which was ineffective because the lines were overloaded. Thus, all means were inoperative, and even the sophisticated equipment recently acquired from the FRG had not been placed into service.

As if by chance, the means of communication of the control room had broken down on 3 January 1984, which raised suspicions and resulted in the interrogation of most of Abdelhamid Skhiri's associates. Some mentioned it to the inquiry commission.

Police officer Mouldi Said pointed out that whenever a police intervention was required, even for soccer games, a preliminary meeting was held in the control room to develop a program of action that would be vigorously applied.

He also stated that police forces were misled by communications and were sent to several locations where not much was happening.

This was the case when police forces were called to Bab El Khadra while the police station, post office and Bata shoestore in Bab Souika were set on fire. When the police forces were called to Bab El-Assal, the Bab Souika delegation was in turn set on fire.

Despite calls from the president of the Den Den municipal district and from the president of the Destourian cell, Mr Belhassen Lahmar, no reinforcements were sent there, and offices and equipment as well as the supermarket were devastated. According to his statement, they were sent to El Agba, where they remained close to two hours.

Requests from the El Hrairia delegate and from the director of the Small Trade and Crafts Office were similarly denied, while demonstrators devastated the delegation and the office. The same thing happened in Bab El Jazira where requests for reinforcements from the police commissioner, Mr Abderrahmane El Bahri, remained unheeded.

According to testimonies by officials of the Ministry of National Education and the courts, police forces withdrew toward the Kasbah when the demonstrators arrived, and the latter then tried to wreck the offices and burn the magistrates' cars and all cars parked there.

The Situation Could Have Been Controlled

Public order brigades could have gained control of the situation without help from the prefecture of police, as they were 1,700, according to Mr Abdelhamid Skhiri, 80 of which were sent to Gafsa on Driss Guiga's orders, although the army had the situation under control in that town.

The brigade, which had all means of dissuasion at its disposal, could have been supported by police forces estimated at 32,000 men. But no police forces were placed at strategic points when the demonstration started, especially on the university campus where they arrived around 10:30 am. The sudden departure

of an armored vehicle and counterorders which lowered the troops' morale were as many factors encouraging the demonstrators to head for downtown. An armored vehicle broke down in Ras Tabia and was besieged by demonstrators; only at the last minute did it receive the order to fire in the air to get rid of them and scatter them, which saved the driver's life.

For his part, the head of the control room, Mr Nejib Bouderbala, transmitted to the police units Mr Abdelhamid Skhiri's instructions to take away all arms and ammunitions from all stations in the Republic and store them at district centers. Thus disarmed, the policemen were unable to fulfill their role and the few tear-gas bombs they had were exhausted during the first hours of the disturbances.

A characterized lack of coordination between interventions was apparent, due to conflicting orders and orders to policemen not to use weapons, even to protect themselves. A far more remarkable fact was the lack of any machinery to clear roads of the barricades and obstacles erected by the demonstrators. The army took care of that. Actually, it would have been possible to have the situation under control already during the first hour, if someone had wanted to. The example of Rades is significant in this respect: there, the demonstrators were scattered within half an hour, and workers were able to protect the property of enterprises against any attempts to destroy it.

A far more disconcerting fact is that police forces were even unable to provide for the chief of state's security, as he returned from Ksar Hellal on the afternoon of 3 January, taking the road leading from the Tunis-Carthage airport to the Carthage Palace. Driss Guiga had asked Mr Mansour Skhiri, governor of Monastir, to persuade the chief of state to go straight to the Charthage Palace in an helicopter as soon as he would be back in Monastir. For the reasons mentioned above, security forces had informed Mr Mohamed Mzali that they were unable to provide protection for him on the road from the Kasbah to his residence.

Although he was aware of the incidents that had taken place in the capital on 3 January, the minister of interior did not react. He did not inform the chief of state nor the prime minister of how serious the situation was. Around 1:30 pm, he called Mr Slaheddine Baly, minister of defense, to inform him that he was unable to control the situation and he asked for an army intervention to protect the capital. The prime minister, who was in Monastir, was informed by Messrs Bechir Zarg El Ayoun and Mezri Chekir.

It was already 4 pm when peace and quiet were restored in the capital and its suburbs, after the intervention of the army.

As for the part played by the National Guard in restoring order in the capital, it was restricted because a large part of this force had been sent to border areas where disturbances had started. Those remaining in the capital were just numerous enough to protect the barracks of the presidential palace, the residence of the prime minister, the Africa Square and the Ezzouhour vocational center.

The Passive Part Played By Intelligence Service In Informing High Officials

It goes without saying that, as far as security is concerned, intelligence plays a part in prevention, in warning of any possible surprise. Considering the mission assigned to them, did these services, from the simple agent to the minister of interior, fully accomplish their duty? Did they actually and objectively assess the situation in the light of the reports they had received, and at what level?

Examining the documents attached to the case, we find that reports (Editor's note: from intelligence services) were piling up on the desks of high officials at the Tunis prefecture, the General Directorate of National Security, the Secretariat of State to National Security and the Ministry of Interior. These reports were especially numerous during the months of November and December 1983. Thus, no less than 15 reports warned of the serious consequences of an increase in the price of bread and cereal products, and mentioned that the General Union of Tunisian Workers was openly hostile to this decision. Thus, the latest report transmitted to Driss Guiga, dated 30 December 1983, is pessimistic and stresses the possibility of serious disturbances; the writer went so far as to compare the situation in this country to the situation prevailing in Cairo in 1977, when similar decisions were made.

Mr Mohamed Ajlani, chief commissioner in Tunis, author of these alarming reports, was the man who warned of the serious risks the country was incurring. He even appealed to be heard by higher officials.

But what happened then, and what action was taken following these reports and warnings? An inquiry made in high places revealed that the President of the Republic was never informed of these reports; he never saw them and never even heard about them.

Neither Driss Guiga nor Ahmed Bennour mentioned them to him. Yet, as can be read in the press, both had frequent meetings with President Bourguiba, during which they reviewed the situation in the country and security problems. Now, during the night of Thursday 5 January 1984, the chief of state was contacted to examine the possibility of repealing the price increase or moderating it. Would not such a step have been more effective if it had been taken earlier, before disturbances started?

Besides, these reports could have been submitted to the Cabinet, which is competent to make adequate political decisions, or to the Political Bureau, the highest party authority, and of which they were members (Editor's note: Messrs Guiga and Bennour). It was thus their duty to inform the proper authorities of the situation, so adequate solutions could be found to the problem and all could face their responsibilities.

Now, our inquiry showed that the debate which took place reached the conclusion that the abolition of the subsidies would cause discontent only in certain circles, no more. This was stated in their respective testimonies by Messrs Mohamed Mzali, prime minister, Slaheddine Baly, minister of national defense, and Frej Chedli, minister of national education.

In this respect, we should note that, because of the positions they held and because of the trust placed in them by the chief of state, Messrs Driss Guiga and Ahmed Bennour should have mentioned the potentially nefarious and serious consequences an increase in the price of bread could have on the country's security. They could have added the question in due time to the agenda of the Cabinet or mentioned it at a periodic meeting of the Political Bureau.

Their failure to do so was a serious breach of the responsibilities they had been given.

The Demonstrations of Friday 6 January 1984 and Their Political Orientations

Obviously, all citizens waited impatiently for the President of the Republic's allocution early on Friday 6 January 1984, which had been announced earlier.

Indeed, as soon as the allocution was over, the crowd filled the streets of the capital, some walking, some in cars. They were jubilant.

This crowd, which had been prepared ahead of time, headed for Habib Bourguiba Avenue, brandishing flags and portraits of the President of the Republic.

Marches were organized during the whole morning, at designated locations. Around 1 pm, these marches took a new turn, as slogans calling for Mr Mohamed Mzali's resignation were shouted.

The marches converged in front of the Ministry of Interior. All the slogans called for the release of the prisoners; some shouted: "The people are with you, Si Driss," and "The people are with you, minister of interior."

Driss Guiga's sympathy for these demonstrators became obvious when he appeared at one of the windows of his office to greet them, made the sign for victory and suggested by precise gestures that they should go to the Carthage Palace. His associates were with him. It looked as if they were having a good laugh and as if they agreed with what the masses were shouting: slogans hostile to Mr Mohamed Mzali. He ordered Mr Ahmed Bennour to authorize police cars to join in the jubilation by using their sirens to play: "Long live Bourguiba"; Mr Hammadi Khouini stated that Driss Guiga ordered him to prepare 170 busses of the National Transport Company and all the trains of the TGM [expansion unknown] to transport the crowd of demonstrators in front of the Carthage Palace, so the President of the Republic would know what they were saying.

Thus, busses and trains went to Carthage. Upon their arrival, the demonstrators gathered in front of the palace, still calling for the prime minister's resignation. Then, Mr Mongi Kooli, former director of the Party, arrived at the head of another march, accompanied by his associates. The two marches merged. Some shouted: "Long live Bourguiba!". Others continued to call for the prime minister's resignation. (In this respect, see the statements made by Messrs Mohamed Tahar El Jaziri, Rabah Taboui, Abada El Kefi and Abdellatif Dahmani.)

Let us now pause to reflect: who placed all these means of transport at the demonstrators' disposal? Who had an interest to do so? Was it Mr Mohamed Mzali for whose resignation the crowd kept calling? This is hard to believe. Therefore, there remains only one conclusion: all that we have recounted until now is only part of the truth, which became obvious in the light of what happened later that afternoon.

One thing was that Driss Guiga--who was in his office--and his associates were as happy as could be, a fact to which one of his assistants testified. Mr Abdelhamid Skhiri confirmed this version. He said that the minister was so carried away with joy that he could not control his feelings.

His associates kept going in and out of their offices and into that of the former minister to keep informed of political developments. He was so much carried away that he took the phone and contacted Mr Ameer Ghedira around 5:05 pm. He told him that, being a close relative of Mr Mohamed Mzali, he should go to the latter's office and persuade him to resign and choose to go in political retirement with dignity before it was too late. For his credibility had been shaken. Therefore, all he had left to do was to go home, and he could do so safely.

At the same time, he allowed the crowd to express its hostility in order to exert moral pressure on the president, to make him change the composition of the Cabinet. For his intention was to make this demand look as if it came from the people, so it could not be taken into account [as published]. In doing so, Driss Guiga may have thought he was shooting the winning goal that would make a political new deal unavoidable at a time when he was heading the list of candidates. In case this Cabinet would be replaced by a new one.

And this, it turns out, is why in a single day the capital changed from the scene of painful incidents to a field for the political battle which had at first been toned down and which became obvious that day when it took the appearance of a power struggle and what political commentators have called "the war of succession."

Is it not cunning to use crowds spontaneously carried away and intent only on safeguarding their purchasing power? These crowds were thus used by professional politicians who did not care about morals and had no respect for the people. What they wanted was to give free rein to their unbridled personal ambitions. The working masses had absolutely nothing to gain, except the damages they had caused and the heavy blows they had struck to the country's social and economic potential. Such was the conclusion at which all newspapers arrived--the national as well as the international press--as well as political commentators of all leanings. Certainly, all these agreed that what started the riots was the abolition of the subsidies on cereals and cereal products. Social inequalities have become so large that this was enough to trigger an explosion. But all these parties do not fail to point out that there had to be a power struggle in the background. It was the opportunity they had so often dreamed of to reopen the debate on succession--Did they forget that we are all in the hand of God?--Then, let them treat this nation with respect.

Therefore, it is obvious that, through the passive attitude he was careful to adopt and through his constant care to escape his constitutional and legal obligations, the prime minister did not do anything to restore order and did not do his duty to safeguard the regime. In accordance with paragraph 3 of article 1 of the decree of 30 May 1975, stating the responsibilities of the minister of interior. Also, he deprived citizens of their rights, as recognized in the Constitution (protection of property and liberties). In this respect, his responsibility is obvious. Besides, he did all he could to take full advantage of the incidents, and was helped in doing so by the unsound atmosphere he had contributed to create. His goal was to trigger a political crisis. In the hope of taking advantage of it. This was a strategy that had been prepared ahead of time.

Conclusion

In conclusion, after reviewing all evidence of the incompetence prevailing at all levels of the Ministry of Interior, including the former minister, the director of national security, the former director of the national police and the prefect of police, who were unable to carry out their preventive role, we can say that we were able to pinpoint all responsibilities. In doing so, we took into account the context of the object of this inquiry.

In addition, we were able to identify deficiencies and failures. These must be remedied, at administrative and social level as well as at political and even educational level, if the government's action is to be consistent and complete; the government's effectiveness is at stake.

In this respect, we appeal to all citizens without exception to be vigilant and to confront anybody who would plan to misappropriate State property or undermine State security. To do so, they must avoid any resentment and any violence whatsoever. For neither resentment nor violence are of any help in solving problems. On the contrary, they just make them more difficult to solve. Otherwise, the country will be devastated by its own children. To achieve this, those who own huge assets must fulfill their obligations to the State and to society. We are calling on them to help change social conditions so as to achieve interaction and solidarity among all social classes.

Only in doing so can they show their solidarity with the poorest.

This is a religious, a moral and a human duty. In accordance with the verse of the Koran which says that those who are poor and deprived shall have access to the money of those who have more than they do. We also appeal to the underprivileged classes, that they should work to earn a living in dignity. In the Holy Book, it is said that it is better to climb a mountain to fetch wood and sell it to earn a living, than to beg.

In addition, this is the time to state again that criticism of our commission, for instance when it is said that it is not truly independent as it consists of civil servants and does not include any independent members or members of the opposition, is without foundation. For during this whole inquiry, which lasted for days, we were careful to remain objective and impartial.

Now is also the time to state again that this commission was constituted by order of the President of the Republic. He appointed its members himself, as his functions allowed him to do, as was explained in the preamble of this report. His objective was to shed full light on the incidents in order to determine the responsibilities of all parties.

This commission, therefore, is important, even if we consider only the moral foundations of the State, which has taken its first steps toward democracy. We can only encourage it. We do not say that the results of our inquiry will satisfy those who have preconceived ideas.

However, we should point out that we worked patiently to reach the truth. We restricted ourselves to four document contents [as published]. Thus, we hope we have fulfilled our mission.

Today, we are addressing the President of the Republic. We are honored to deliver this document to you. In it, you may well find elements that will help you in making the decisions you are about to make. We wish you a long life to protect this nation through your wisdom, with God's help.

Written on 29 February 1984, at the Supreme Court of Appeal

Casualties

The Commission of Inquiry drew up a list of casualties---dead and wounded---among the civilian population and among police forces, by governorate, as follows:

| <u>Governorates</u> | <u>Dead</u> | <u>Wounded among the civilian population</u> | <u>Wounded among police forces</u> |
|---------------------|-------------|--|--|
| Tunis | 29 | 255 | 224 |
| Gafsa | 8 | 73 | 12 |
| Gabes | 6 | 36 | 11 |
| Le Kef | 10 | 44 | - |
| Jendouba | 3 | 16 | - |
| Sfax | 9 | 31 | 2 |
| Beja | 1 | 4 | - |
| Sidi Bouzid | 1 | 2 | - |
| Siliana | - | - | 4 |
| Tozeur | 2 | 12 | 10 |
| Kebili | 2 | 26 | 8 |
| Medenine | 5 | 21 | 11 |
| Kasserine | 6 | 19 | 12 |
| Monastir | 5 | 39 | 34 |
| Kairouan | 2 | 12 | 19 |
| Sousse | - | - | 1 |
| | <hr/> 89 | <hr/> 590 | <hr/> 348 |

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CSO: 4519/161

PRESIDENT SPEAKS TO INDO-ARAB MEET, INTEGRATION PARLEY

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 9 Apr 84 p 9

[Text] Hyderabad, April 8--President Zail Singh, addressing the annual function of the Indo-Arab League here today, reiterated India's firm support to the Palestinian cause.

The President said that India considered the rise of Arab nationalism as one of the most potent forces on the international scene. "Even before our independence, we had expressed sympathy for and support to the Arab cause. Indian and Arab leaders regarded their struggle against colonial rule as a nationalistic one but at the same time as a part of a larger movement against imperialism, colonialism and oppression everywhere," he said.

India's consistent and principled support for the Palestinian people had been much appreciated by "our Arab brothers." The current situation in this part of the world posed a serious threat. "We are all witness to an escalating arms race and increased superpower presence and rivalry in this region. The passage of time is working against the Arab cause and the rights of the Palestinian people," he said.

The President later commended the chief minister, Mr Rama Rao's speech in three languages--English, Telugu and Hindi--and said the chief minister had truly implemented the three-language formula.

Earlier, immediately after arrival, Mr Zail Singh addressed a seminar on national integration where he warned the nation against forces of disruption and chaos. He said no foreign power could disintegrate India, but forces within the country were posing a serious threat to the nation's integrity.

PTI adds: Mr Zail Singh reiterated that India believed in establishing a good-neighbourly relationship with Pakistan. "We are not only just trying for it but we want it," he said.

He said that India believed in improvement of the developing countries and wanted their problems to be solved on humanitarian grounds.

He said some countries were jealous of the friendship between India and Arab nations and wanted to create some misunderstanding and differences between them always. "But both sides are vigilant and understand their sinister moves."

"If we are united, no power on earth could shake us," he added.

Mr Zail Singh said that with the support of the Arab countries the non-aligned movement was strengthened.

Meanwhile, an Indo-Arab cultural centre is proposed to be set up here by the Indo-Arab League, its chairman, Mr Syed Vicaruddin, announced today.

Mr Vicaruddin, who is also the chief editor of "Rehnuma-e-Deccan," a local daily, said that the proposed centre would have a well-equipped library, reading room and information centre.

He said facilities for research studies on West Asia would also be provided at the centre. While Arab students would have facilities to learn Telugu and Urdu, Telugu and Urdu-knowing people could learn Arabic.

UNI adds: Mr Zail Singh said he was happy that India and the Arab countries which always had a cultural affinity, were rapidly developing a significant economic link. A large number of Indians were now working with their Arab brothers on important projects in many Arab countries and these endeavours were yielding results which were the envy of the rest of the world.

"I know that Indians who are in Arab countries are happy and would like to continue to contribute to the prosperity of their host countries," he said.

"This increasing inter-dependence in the economic world had important security implications. Our security is now interlinked with that of the Arab world and this was yet another reason which brings together the people of India and their Arab brothers," he said.

He said that India's relations with other countries were not based on religion but on humanitarian grounds. Despite the parliament being in session, the prime minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, had gone to Tunisia and Libya to express our solidarity with the Arabs."

CSO: 4600/1783

REPORTAGE ON GANDHI VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST

Ties With Libya

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 9 Apr 84 pp 1, 9

[Text] Tripoli, April 8 (UNI)--India and Libya turned a new leaf in their bilateral relations when they decided to upgrade their economic and technical co-operation and explore ways to achieve a "higher level of political relationship.

These decisions emerged following wide-ranging talks between the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, and the Libyan leader, Col Moammar Gaddafi. No joint communique or statement was issued at the end of the Prime Minister's first-ever visit to this oil rich country.

The difference in the approach of the two countries to certain international issues was reflected when Col Gaddafi told Mrs Gandhi last night that "our extensive economic co-operation is not matched by political cooperation." There is slight difference in the perceptions of India and Libya on ways to resolve the Palestinian problem and the Iran-Iraq war.

Both leaders, however, agreed to increasingly co-operate in the non-aligned movement and other international forum to achieve their common objective of peace and stability in the region and the world.

Both sides said that the atmosphere at the talks was "very cordial." The talks covered the international situation, developments in West Asia, particularly the latest situation in Lebanon and measures to give a further push to their bilateral economic relations.

They discussed the prospects of Indian collaboration in Libya in the field of construction, power generation and railways.

It was also decided that the next meeting of the Indo-Libyan joint commission would be held in Tripoli next month.

Mr Romesh Bhandari, secretary in the external affairs ministry, had a series of discussions with senior Libyan officials to identify new areas of economic and technical co-operation.

Mrs Gandhi reiterated India's firm commitment to the principles of non-alignment and stressed how this movement demanded acceptance of diversity. She also explained how "certain elements had been trying to create problems for India and put pressure." She also apprised the Libyan side of the steps India had taken to establish more friendly relations with its neighbours, including Pakistan.

Mrs Gandhi is also understood to have briefly touched upon the dangers arising out of the arming of Pakistan and how it threatened to spark an arms race in the region.

Our correspondent M. Shamim adds: As the Libyan visit of Mrs Indira Gandhi ended on Sunday night, it is clear that Libya gives more importance to close Indo-Libyan co-operation in international politics than the Iran-Iraq war.

The issue, however, did figure during the talks between Mrs Gandhi and Col Gaddafi. The latter reiterated his country's position on the issue which clearly favoured Iran. Mrs Gandhi equally stated that continued efforts should be made to bring the unfortunate conflict to an end.

Col Gaddafi came out more strongly in favour of close bilateral relations between the two countries, indirectly suggesting that India take more interest in Arab countries with socialist systems and review its policy towards the Arab countries.

He pointed out that most Arab regimes were hostile to the Arab masses unlike Libya. He paid tributes to both Mahatma Gandhi, who led the country to political freedom and Pandit Nehru, who built its economic infrastructure.

Col Gaddafi pleaded for concerted efforts by both India and the Arab countries to establish world peace. He referred to Israel's acquisition of 200 nuclear warheads and said this indicated that Israel sought to "annihilate the Arab world."

On Sunday morning, Mrs Gandhi paid a visit to the martyrs' memorial and later visited an exhibition of Libyan products. The exhibition strongly resembled the Pragati Maiden in New Delhi. "It seems that they too have a Mohammad Yunus," Mrs Gandhi remarked to her advisers while she was going around the pavilions in the exhibitions.

The Prime Minister evinced keen interest in the range of goods produced by Libya. She later paid a visit to the girls military college and inspected a smartly turned-out guard of honour before she met the cadets and officers.

Gandhi Meets With 'Arafat, Bourguiba

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 10 Apr 84 p 1

[Text] Tunis, April 9 (UNI)--The Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, today reiterated India's full support to the Palestine Liberation Organisation under the leadership of Mr Yasser Arafat.

Mrs Gandhi told the PLO chief, who called on her today, that it was most important at this crucial time for the Arab nations to maintain their unity and to achieve greater cohesion in the ranks of the PLO.

Mr Arafat flew in here from Sanaa in the Yemen Arab Republic yesterday to meet Mrs Gandhi who is on a two-day visit to Tunisia.

During his 50-minute meeting with Mrs Gandhi at La Marsa Palace where she is staying, Mr Arafat gave her a full account of the progress of unity within the PLO.

Mrs Gandhi said India was totally committed to the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinians and was anxious that they secure a homeland as soon as possible.

Indian delegation sources said Mr Arafat told Mrs Gandhi that now there was no problem of disunity in the PLO and that he had overcome the difficulties created by the dissidents.

Meeting With Bourguiba

Mr Arafat also explained to Mrs Gandhi the outcome of the recent meeting of the Arab League foreign ministers at Algiers.

Mr Arafat told Mrs Gandhi of the PLO stand at the coming meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference and of the meeting of the committee on Jerusalem under King Hasan of Morocco.

Mrs Gandhi informed him of the talks she had with the Libyan leader, Col Muammar Gaddafi, in Tripoli on the Palestinian problem.

Mrs Gandhi's meeting with the 82-year-old Tunisian President, Mr Bourguiba, today was sentimental.

President Bourguiba was visibly moved when Mrs Gandhi drove to the Palace of the Republic at Carthage to meet him.

Mr Bourguiba feelingly recalled the support he received for Tunisia independence from Jawaharlal Nehru. "I am deeply touched by your visit," the aging President, who was in the forefront of the Tunisian freedom struggle, told Mrs Gandhi.

The President accompanied Mrs Gandhi to the martyrs memorial where she laid a wreath. Tunisia is observing Martyrs Memorial Day today.

Hundreds of people gathered at the Martyrs Memorial as Mrs Gandhi and President Bourguiba arrived there. The people continuously chanted in Arabic Yahya Indira Gandhi, Yahya Bourguiba (long live Indira Gandhi, long live Bourguiba).

Mrs Gandhi evinced great interest in the ruins of the ancient civilisation of Carthage. She also visited a museum there.

Mrs Gandhi visited the Arab League officer here and met its office-bearers.

CSO: 4600/1783

GANDHI INTERVIEW WITH DOHA DAILY SUMMARIZED :

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 12 Apr 84 p 9

[Text] Doha (Qatar), April 11 (UNI)--The Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, charged that Pakistan was going back on the Simla agreement.

In a wide-ranging interview with the Arab daily "Arryah," published here on Monday, Mrs Gandhi said it was of concern to India that Pakistan was amassing armaments.

"It is our right to express concern over the pouring of arms and ammunition into a neighbouring country, because previous experience has proved that such arms and ammunitions have been used against us."

Asked about India's alleged involvement in a reported coup attempt against President Zia-Ul-Haq, Mrs Gandhi said India had never interfered in Pakistani affairs and it would never do so.

Mrs Gandhi called on "everyone who has influence" over Iraq and Iran to help end the Gulf war which has been raging for more than three-and-a-half years.

She, however, felt that the atmosphere for peace "is not encouraging at all."

On the Palestinian problem, Mrs Gandhi regretted the split in the ranks. "If this had not happened, something (a solution) would have been achieved. But at present I cannot say that there is anything positive in the affair."

On Afghanistan she said, "If the world had not made a big fuss, and reacted strongly at the beginning of the Afghan problem, a solution might have been achieved." But when the Soviets felt from the beginning that there was a well-planned move against them, it made the problem very difficult for them.

India's opinion differed with those countries who "criticised the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and did not oppose others' intervention elsewhere in the world," she said.

Referring to the proposed visit of the Emir, Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani to India, beginning on April 18, Mrs Gandhi said that economic co-operation between the two countries was passing through a delicate, developing stage but she hoped both the leaders would discuss ways of promoting it.

CSO: 4600/1786

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY PREDICTS RECORD GRAIN CROP

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 1 Apr 84 p 1

[Text] The country's foodgrain production during 1983-84 may be about 146 million tonnes, an all-time high, though official estimates put the figure at little over 144 million tonnes.

The previous highest production was 133.3 million tonnes in 1981-82. Last year's production was only 128.4 million tonnes.

According to the estimates available with the Agriculture Ministry sources, the kharif production during 1983-84 was about 84 million tonnes and the Rabi production is expected to cross the target of 59 million tonnes.

For the first time, rice production is expected to reach a record level of 57 million tonnes as against the average production of 53-54 million tonnes.

According to unofficial estimates, however, the Rabi production during 1983-84 might exceed 62 million tonnes as against the target of 59 million tonnes.

Wheat output during the year is estimated by Krishi Bhawan officials to exceed 43 million tonnes, crossing last year's record level of 42.5 million tonnes. But actually, this may be well over 45 million tonnes. The production of pulses and oilseeds is expected to exceed 120 and 125 lakh tonnes respectively.

The factors responsible for higher production during last year include optimum use of inputs and farm management and an effective education extension programme.

The Agriculture Ministry laid considerable emphasis on the availability and proper application of fertilizers. While in 1978-79, year of the highest production, the consumption of fertilizer was only of the order of 51 lakh tonnes, it is estimated to have gone up to 72 lakh tonnes in 1983-84--an increase by about 50 percent.

The distribution of high quality seeds during these two periods was 9 lakh quintals and 57 lakh quintals which was a phenomenal rise. Likewise, the area under high-yielding varieties of cereals also went up from 40 million hectares in 1978-79 to 52 million hectares during 1983-84.

The Ministry got distributed among the farmers printed literature guiding them on farm practices to be adopted in a specific crop. Besides, teams were deputed for on-the-spot study of the problems the farmers might be facing in getting inputs and helping them in securing them. The teams made special efforts to ensure that electricity for tubewells or pumps and irrigation in the commands of canals were made available to the farmers.

CSO: 4600/1765

INDIA

FAROOQ ABDULLAH NOTES NEED FOR OPPOSITION UNITY

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 6 Apr 84 p 4

[Text] Chandigarh, April 4--Mr Farooq Abdullah, Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, yesterday said that radical surgery would be needed to forge Opposition unity in the country. Many might have to lose identity for common national interest. Asked if it could mean National Conference too, he said: "Yes."

Mr Abdullah, who was speaking at a "Meet the Press" programme of the Chandigarh Press Club, said party barriers and interests might have to be overcome for national interest. Some leaders might have to forego offices and respective positions. There would have to be a common ideology and that ideology would be the nation. If the nation survived, everybody would survive.

In reply to a question, he said that he had not lost hope of unity. He, like a doctor, would be hopeful till the last breath of the patient. He said that he would attend the next Opposition meeting.

The Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister answered questions on many subjects. About Punjab, he said valuable time had been lost. The problem could have been solved easily long ago. He made it clear that there could be no political killings if there were sane people in the world. Politicians were responsible for the killings because they created mistrust and hatred among different communities. He said that he knew who were behind the Punjab problem but would not identify them for the moment.

He recalled that he had met Akali leaders in Amritsar and also Mrs Gandhi in search for a solution of the problem long ago but his intentions were doubted by the ruling party and he withdrew. He was all for a solution to the problem because survival of Punjab meant survival of Jammu and Kashmir. The road to his State was from Punjab. He also regretted that some leaders did not want the settlement when there were hopeful signs last year.

He reiterated his view that the Kashmiris were part of India. He and the National Conference were not pro-Pakistan but the Congress (I) had projected them as such to create misunderstanding about him and to get him out of power. He referred to the cricket match controversy. He said there was no threat to his Government under normal democratic rules.

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Asked if the new State Governor had been appointed with his consent, he said that certain traditions had long died down in the country.

Asked about Mr Maqbool Butt's hanging, he said there was no Kashmir Liberation Front in Kashmir and it was an entity in London.

He defended Article 370 of the Constitution giving special status to the State because it helped Kashmiri Muslims feel safe as far as their identity in a Hindu-dominated India was concerned.

He said that he would always have complaints against the Janata Party. While in power it did not bring an anti-defection Bill and it did not make Akashvani and Doordarshan an autonomous corporation as promised. He said that he had no complaint against the National Press. Rather he was grateful to it for helping him through difficult situations.

CSO: 4600/1778

KASHMIR GOVERNOR REPRIMANDS FAROOQ ABDULLAH

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 12 Apr 84 p 9

[Text] Srinagar, April 11--The governor, Mr B.K. Nehru, today pulled up the Jammu and Kashmir chief minister, Dr Farooq Abdullah for causing embarrassment to the head of state.

The governor's remarks came at the inauguration of the prestigious Sheri-i-Kashmir conference centre on the banks of the Dal Lake this evening. Mr Nehru was earlier taken out in a boat procession from Nehru gate to the conference centre and it was the manner in which this part of the function was organised that he took exception to.

Mr Nehru said that when he had accepted the invitation he thought that the boat procession would be a citizens' function. He was dismayed to find that a citizens' function had been "hijacked" by a political party. The governor, who was supposed to be above party politics and non-partisan, had been subjected to a flag-waving and slogan-shouting political demonstration.

His pleasure at having been invited to inaugurate the complex had considerably diminished. He said this was most "inappropriate."

The boat procession about which the ruling party had made public announcements sported the flags of the National Conference.

C.M. Makes Amends

The governor for whom this was the last official function before his departure for Gujarat, also took an indirect swipe at the laudatory references made about him by the chief minister. He said the standards of public life had deteriorated to such an extent in this country that anybody doing his assigned task was supposed to have performed an extraordinary feat. As governor, he had only done his duty which he had sworn to do and for which he had been paid.

Later, the chief minister made amends for having embarrassed the governor. But while doing so he injected a note of politics, causing further discomfort to Mr Nehru.

The chief minister said that certain quarters were attempting to create problems in the state through the use of money and power. He did not identify these elements. He reminded the governor that he had told the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, that he would continue as chief minister only as long as he enjoyed the confidence of the people.

He explained that the shouting of slogans and waving of party flags was "spontaneous" and an expression of the love the people of the state had for Mr Nehru.

CSO: 4600/1786

INDIA

INDIA, PORTUGAL TO INCREASE BILATERAL RELATIONS

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 12 Apr 84 p 9

[Text] Lisbon, April 11 (PTI)--Agreeing to treat the past as a closed chapter, India and Portugal have decided to increase bilateral co-operation and give greater content to their relations, particularly in economic and cultural fields.

Following the talks the external affairs minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao had with Prime Minister Dr Mario Soares and the foreign minister, Dr Jaime Gama, the two countries have agreed to hold meetings of economic and cultural committees to work out the details of increasing co-operation.

"A delicate moment in our relations is definitely overcome," Dr Gama told Narasimha Rao--the first Indian foreign minister to visit Portugal--in an obvious reference to the liberation of Goa.

'No Bitterness'

In his response Mr Narasimha Rao said links of history and culture between India and Portugal had been forged "in times and under circumstances which are long past" and they remained now as a rich cultural heritage.

"We have no bitterness. We want Goa to be an important link rather than a hindrance. We are especially keen to preserve our cultural links and Indian government has responded warmly to that," Dr Gama explained in an interview.

Mr Rao talked for nearly 40 minutes with Dr Soares, who, as foreign minister of Portugal, took the initiative in 1974 to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries, 13 years after the liberation of Goa.

Mr Rao, assisted by Mr I.S. Chaddha, additional secretary in the external affairs ministry, and the Indian ambassador Mr A.N.D. Haksar, had a detailed exchange of views on bilateral matters as well as international issues with Dr Gama. The situation in West Asia and in southern Africa were among the topics discussed.

P.M. Invited

Dr Soares told the Indian minister that he wanted to broaden the scope of Indo-Portuguese relations. He renewed his invitation to the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi to visit Portugal not only as the leader of a great country but also as the daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, whom he holds in high esteem.

Portuguese leaders are pleased that Mr Rao has undertaken the visit to Lisbon. They warmly received him. Leaders of all major political parties and Dr Gama attended a reception hosted for him at the residence of Mr Haksar, Portuguese television and press have given substantial coverage to the visit.

Dr Gama said: "We are an aligned country" but we have deep appreciation of India and its role as the leader of the non-aligned movement which is a voice for moderation in the world. There is a mutual desire to strengthen our relations."

Mr Rao expressed satisfaction at the outcome of his talks here and said that there was a genuine desire on both sides to give a new content to bilateral ties.

CSO: 4600/1786

ECONOMIC RESEARCH COUNCIL PREDICTS 7 PERCENT GROWTH

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 1 Apr 84 p 5

[Text] Indian economy appears to be well poised for seven percent growth during 1983-84, reports UNI.

The average growth in the four years of the sixth five-year Plan has been close to the target and at no stage the growth rate was negative, says the economic review by the National Council of Applied Economy Research (NCAER) for the third quarter for the current financial year (October-December 1983).

The prospects of agriculture looked even brighter after a good kharif season with yet another record rabi in the offing, the review says.

The growth rate of industrial output showed an improvement during the quarter after hovering around 3.7 percent during the last one year.

The review says that these developments, however, failed to exercise an effective check on the price line and as a result the prime dilemma dominated the country's economic scene during the quarter.

Foodgrains

Foodgrains production during the year is likely to touch a new high, above the target, around 144 million tonnes. Commercial crops, on the other hand, present a mixed picture.

The review says it is too early to guess about the likely growth of the economy in 1984-85 but even if the monsoon is below normal, the growth rate should be positive and not less than 1.7 percent achieved in the drought year 1982-83.

The review says that the plan outlay for 1983-84 earlier fixed at Rs 25,490.32 crore has been stepped up by Rs 1,555.17 crore to Rs 27,045.49 crore to meet the increasing requirements of several sectors. Main beneficiaries of this increased outlay are: industry and minerals (Rs 591 crores), railways (Rs 160 crore), coal (Rs 140 crore), power and telecommunications (Rs 100 crore each).

This additional outlay is likely to push up the size of the budget deficit which in 1983-84 was estimated at Rs 1,555 crore.

It is expected that agriculture will show a growth of about 10 percent in 1983-84 contrast with the four percent decline in 1982-83 and 5.5 percent growth in 1981-82.

It is expected that, given normal weather, the production of rabi crops would be higher than the target of 59 million tonnes set for the season.

Drop in Cotton

Actual production of cotton is expected to be around 77 lakh bales contrary to the earlier expectations of 85 lakh bales. The decline has been attributed to the damage to the standing crops in some of the major cotton producing States--Maharashtra, Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan--where production is about 25 percent lower than expected earlier.

The index of industrial production continued to grow though at a rate lower than the target. The average monthly index for the first eleven months of 1983 was 4.2 percent higher than the corresponding period last year.

Industry

The review says data on production in 17 major industries with a total weight of 45.9 percent, shows that their aggregate performance improved considerably in recent months. These industries registered a combined growth of 4.7 percent during April-November 1983. The growth rate which was 2.8 percent in the first four months of the financial year (April-July 1983) went up notably to five percent during August-November 1983.

Coal, aluminium, vanaspati, fertilisers and commercial vehicles which had suffered deceleration earlier, recorded positive growth during the latter period.

Power

During the first nine months of the year, April-December 1983, the five percent growth achieved in power generation continued to be much lower than the target of 10.2 percent for 1983-84.

Almost the entire growth in power generation in April-December 1983 was contributed by 7.1 percent rise in thermal generation, hydel generation, which in April-September 1983 was 6.7 percent lower than in April-September 1982, improved considerably after monsoon.

Though nuclear power generation increased by over 42 percent during this period, its share in total production being low, its impact on the availability of electricity was only marginal.

The review says the production of saleable steel during April-December 1983 was 19.2 percent lower than that in April-December last year. This deceleration is due to sluggish domestic demand and urge to reduce piled up stocks of 1982-83 when overall production was not restrained to match the demand.

According to latest estimates, cement production during the year is expected to be around 26-27 million tonnes, close to the target of 28 million tonnes.

The review says that as the scheme of modernisation of cement plants are already in progress, one can hopefully look forward to an area era of comfortable cement availability in not so distant a future.

Price Index

Price indices--both wholesale and consumer--continued to rise despite the overall growth of the economy, presenting a peculiar dilemma of inflation amidst growth.

The bulk of the price rise, however, is confined to a small number of commodities--pulses, fibres, oilseeds, edible oils, sugar, jute manufacture and tobacco. The answer to the question of price-rise should--therefore, be looked into reasons that are commodity-specific rather than aggregative, it says.

The review says the balance of payments position, net of IMF loan, continues to be under strain, even though the average rate of decline in foreign exchange reserves appears under control. The reserves, however, recorded a marginal rise during the quarter.

The country's foreign trade presented a somewhat satisfactory picture in April-November 1983 when the provisional exports increased by 6.7 percent and imports declined by 3.8 percent. This indicates that the trade deficits in 1983-84 will be notably lower than that in 1982-83.

The rate of export growth has remained much below the target of 19 percent for the year, it adds.

CSO: 4600/1765

BHARATIYA JANATA NATIONAL EXECUTIVE MEETS

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 3 Apr 84 pp 1, 9

[Text] Ahmedabad, April 2--The national executive of the Bharatiya Janata Party has given a call for Punjab bandh tomorrow and a bandh in Delhi, Haryana and Himachel Pradesh on Wednesday to protest against the killing of the party's Amritsar district unit president, Mr Herbanslal Khanna, and two others today.

Briefing newsmen on the deliberations of the national executive which concluded its three-day session here today, Mr Ram Jethmalani, BJP vice-president, said the killing of Mr Khanna indicated that the extremists had started singling out political leaders to strike terror among political parties. The implications of this were grave as this kind of "blackmail" of political parties would totally destroy the democratic process.

Mr Jethmalani, the party general secretary, Mr L.K. Advani, and some other leaders including Mr Vijay Malhotra, Mr Yagnadutt Sharma, Mr Krishanjal Sharma and the Punjab unit president, Dr Baldev Prakash, and vice-president Sardar Brijendra Singh, cancelled all their engagements here for the evening to rush to Amritsar to participate in the funeral procession of Mr Khanna tomorrow.

The national executive, which was in session when news about the murder of Mr Khanna, another BJP activist, Mr Kewal Krishna and Mr Khanna's bodyguard reached here, adopted a condolence resolution expressing its deep sense of shock. It felt "outraged" over the government's "utter failure to control violence and curb terrorists in Punjab."

The party demanded that the Central government should reform the electoral system and refurbish and restore the utility of the institution of commission of inquiry to check widespread corruption in public life.

In a resolution, the BJP also demanded the rationalisation of the tax structure to provide sufficient incentives for savings and to prevent harassment of honest taxpayers.

Through another resolution it demanded an amendment to the constitution to give constitutional sanction to the existence of the local self-government bodies to protect them from arbitrary supersession.

In a five-page resolution on corruption, the executive said the efficacy of the institution of the commission of inquiry, which was a useful and powerful instrument for discovering truth, particularly about the character of politicians, had been ruined by the ruling party for selfish reasons and to avoid the consequences of adverse findings.

Demanding refurbishing and restoration of the institution, the executive demanded amendment of the Commission of Inquiry Act to provide that a presiding judge should be nominated for every commission by the chief justice of India in consultation with a panel selected from the retired chief justices of India and lok pals, if any.

It also demanded that anyone indicted by the commission should, at its discretion, be disqualified from holding any public office for a designated period and every commission should have the power to punish a person for contempt like a court.

The resolution said the primary cause of corruption was the present electoral system. Colossal sums were required for greasing the electoral machine. The ruling party habitually flaunted its vast resources on the eve of elections "in corrupt and obscene manner."

It alleged that these vast resources were collected by the ruling party by misuse of government power.

The people's "right to know" should be recognised and enforced by law. No government files classified as secret and confidential should be given exemption from production in any court or public inquiry if it contained or was suspected to contain any evidence relevant to the proof of corruption, it added.

A less important cause of corruption was the somewhat irrational tax structure and the low salaries of public officials. This should be effectively changed.

The resolution on foreign policy made it clear that unity and integrity of the country and preservation of the nation from internal and external threats was not a partisan political issue and, as a first step towards achieving consensus, it was imperative for the government to take the nation and the people into confidence and explain the dangers that faced the country.

The party believed that neither India nor Pakistan could afford a new arms race. But the U.S. supply of armaments to Pakistan was a matter of grave concern. If Pakistan went nuclear, India could not default in defence and should develop the power to act as a deterrent to Pakistan's aggressive intentions.

The resolution said the initiatives so far taken under the aegies of the South Asian regional conference had been marked by an inexplicable bureaucratic caution. The time had now come for breaking new grounds and if the country faced any extraordinary situation it would have to be by extraordinary responses. The need of the hour was to move away from "politicking" and aspire for a nationally united quest for peace in and around South Asia.

The resolution on the local self-government bodies decried the manner in which the Bombay municipal corporation was superseded by the Maharashtra government. It expressed grave concern over the "growing tendency among the Congress state governments" to deprive citizens of being governed by their elected representatives in the local self-government bodies. It was obvious that the Congress Party did not like to face any election before the Lok Sabha election, lest a defeat in the local self-government bodies adversely affected its prospects in the general election.

It said the national executive was of the view that the tendency to wreck local bodies which were "cradles of democracy and the training grounds for democratic values and practices" should be curbed.

CSO: 4600/1781

INDIA

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST CHIEF ADVOCATES NEW PARTY

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 3 Apr 84 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, April 2 (UNI)--The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) chief, Mr H.N. Bahuguna, today spoke of his efforts to form a brand new "secular and left-of-the-centre" party, thus denying reports about his joining the Lok Dal.

Talking to newsmen here, he said neither had he any idea to join the Lok Dal nor its president Charan Singh had asked him to do so. However, he was all for a new party of which both of them could be members.

Mr Bahuguna felt that the united front of which his DSP was a partner along with the Janata Party and others, was not an adequate response to the current political situation. Nothing short of a single unified party would be acceptable to the people as an alternative to the Congress, he added.

Asked whether the leadership issue stood in the way of the new political formation, he said he was not in the run.

He hastened to add that it would be known within the next 20 days who acted as a stumbling block.

Asked whether the united front now stood dissolved, Mr Bahuguna remarked that it was all right in the absence of one party. However, even at the time of its formation last year he had made it known that the front alone would not be of much help.

He would like the Janata Party Congress (S), Congress (J) and Lok Dal to form part of the proposed new party.

Mr Bahuguna denied that he had worked for the defeat of the front nominee, Mr Raj Narain, in the Rajya Sabha biennial election in Uttar Pradesh. In fact, there was no front candidate in the absence of which DSP MLAs supported the Lok Dal nominees.

PTI adds: Mr Bahuguna today announced that five prominent leaders in the fields of administration, trade union and social work had joined his party.

Presenting the new entrants to newsmen at a press conference here, Mr Bahuguna gave their names as Mr Chanan Singh from Punjab, a trade union worker, and Mr B.R. Tamta, a retired IAS man, Dr Paras Nath Singh, an educationist, Mr Pravin Sharma, general secretary of all-India Dastakar Sangh, and Mr Vakil Ahmed Ansari, all from U.P.

CSO: 4600/1781

INDIA

BRIEFS

COFFEE TO USSR--Bangalore, March 31 (PTI)--India has signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for export of 16,000 tonnes of green coffee and 500 tonnes of instant coffee. Mr S.K. Warriar, chairman of the Coffee Board told the 108th meeting of the board here yesterday that the board had also successfully contracted to effect a trial shipment of 10.5 tonnes of instant coffee to a party in the United Kingdom. The board was expecting further orders for continuous supply of about 100 tonnes per month to that country if the trial proved successful, he said. Mr Warriar said that the prospects of 1984-85 coffee crop were reported to be "very good" and the current indications of the crop were around the level of 1.70 lakh tonnes. [Text] [New Delhi PATRIOT in English 1 Apr 84 p 2]

CREDIT TO MAURITIUS--India has extended a new credit of Rs 5 crores to Mauritius, reports UNI. An agreement for this third government-to-government credit was signed by Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart from Mauritius Seetenah Lutchmeenaraidoo in the Capital on Saturday. The earlier two credits of Rs 5 crores in 1975 and Rs 10 crores in 1978 have been fully utilised by Mauritius. The new credit will be available to Mauritius for financing export of capital goods, second hand ships and consultancy services from India. The Export-Import Bank of India has also extended a credit of Rs 5 crores for financing export of capital and other engineering goods needed for development of medium and small scale industries in Mauritius. Both the government and Exim Bank credits will be utilised on a priority basis. These credits would go a long way in further strengthening the existing commercial and economic relations between the two countries, says an official release. [Text] [New Delhi THE PATRIOT in English 1 Apr 84 p 5]

AID TO NEPAL--Kathmandu, March 31 (UNI)--India will provide Rs 49.3 million assistance to Nepal for the construction of the Chandra canal project in East Nepal and for the supply of iodised salt in different districts. Under the Indo-Nepalese bilateral cooperation programme, the first grant of Rs 45.7 million encompasses the construction of a pumped canal from the western Koshi canal and its distribution system. The Rs 390 million project on which Rs 223.5 million have been spent so far and which expected to be completed by June 1985, will irrigate 34,690 hectares of land in Nepal terai. [Text] [New Delhi PATRIOT in English 1 Apr 84 p 7]

URANIUM SMUGGLING SUSPECTED--Patna, April 12--Is uranium being smuggled from the Jadugoda uranium mines in Singhbhum district of Bihar to Pakistan? According to Indian Embassy sources in Katmandu, Nepal, uranium is being smuggled from the Jadugoda mines via Katmandu to Pakistan. While details of the clandestine operations are not readily available, the modus operandi of the gang engaged in the smuggling is to despatch uranium in trucks to Katmandu from where the stuff is flown to Pakistan by international airliner. The complicity of some mine employees is obvious. The Embassy has apprised the Government of India of the racket and the Union Home Ministry has in turn alerted the Bihar Government.--Our Special Correspondent. [Text] [Madras THE HINDU in English 13 Apr 84 p 1] 9459

NEW SIKKIM PARTY--A new party, which is expected to pose a serious challenge to Mr Narbahadur Bhandar, chief minister, in the new elections, was launched in Gangtok on Monday, reports our correspondent. Styled as "Sikkim Gorkha League," the party has been organized by Mr Narbahadu Khatiwada, who was one of the main youth organisers of the 1973 revolution in Sikkim which overthrew the Chogyal's regime. Mr Khatiwada says that the Gorkha league will embrace all the three communities in Sikkim--the Nepalese, Bhutias and Lapchas--and will have the interests of the plains' people always in view. [Text] [Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 11 Apr 84 p 13]

9459

CSO: 4600/1787

KHO'INIHA ON TABAS RESCUE ATTEMPT, PILGRIMAGE, ELECTIONS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 26 Apr 84 pp 3, 4

[Interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Musavi-Kho'iniha; date, place and interviewer not specified]

[Text] In connection with 25 April, the anniversary of the failure of the U.S. military invasion in the Tabas desert, Hojjat ol-Eslam Musavi-Kho'iniha held an interview in which he also spoke in detail about the hajj pilgrimage and its program as well as the election of the second term of the Majlis. Due to the importance of this interview, the exact text is printed here.

Military Aggression of the United States in Tabas

In this interview, Mr Musavi-Kho'iniha first said in connection with the actions of the United States after the capture of the spy nest and the various intrigues, including the military attack in Tabas:

After the incident of the U.S. spy nest and the taking of the U.S. spies who lived there under the pretext of being diplomats as hostages, the United States engaged in extensive measures to free the hostages while not wanting to destroy the existing relations between Iran and the United States. In other words, since the beginning, the United States, which was trying to make Iran agree to free the hostages through peaceful means and did not achieve any results, was forced to destroy the bridges behind it. In this connection, the United States turned to compromising and conservative elements within the Iranian governing organization after the victory of the revolution, establishing contact with individuals such as Qotbzadeh, Bani-Sadr, some of the ministers of the transitional government, and certain individuals in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, it did not achieve any results until 7 April 1980, that is, about five months after the taking of the hostages.

One of the major reasons for their not achieving any results was that contact with Imam Khomeyni was impossible for the United States and the contacts made with Qotbzadeh and Bani-Sadr were suddenly confronted with an unanticipated decision by the imam and all the plans for freeing the hostages were cast to the wind. On this date, 7 April 1980, the United States declared the severance of relations with Iran as a pressure leverage. After the economic embargo and the propaganda pressure and after forcing its friends to sever diplomatic relations with Iran and put political pressure on Iran and then witnessing that these measures were not working, the United States engaged in this action in order to, as it supposed, inflict a heavy blow to the revolution. But the imam reacted in his important communique in such a way that the severance of relations actually served to mobilize the forces internally. In this connection, the imam's interpretation was that if the United States had done anything in its entire political history in the interest of the oppressed people of the world, it was this severing of relations.

When the United States confronted such a reaction and failed to see this sharp blade, as a last effort, it engaged in a series of actions, deciding on military aggression under the pretext of freeing the hostages, hoping to strike a deadly blow to the Islamic revolution. We say a pretext because when we look at their plan of operation, we realize that the hostages could by no means have been freed. Supposing that the rescue group could have come to Tehran from the Tabas desert and that it would have succeeded in entering the city, certainly around the spy nest there would have been violent skirmishes involving the law enforcement forces, including the committees, Guards Corps, and police and even the army in the city, and, naturally, they would not have allowed these groups to return safely. Therefore, this plan was very unsuccessful and, in fact, they were using the pretext of freeing the hostages in order to attack the city of Tehran, during which attack certain centers, including the home of the imam, were to be hit. They imagined that with a rapid attack on the centers of the city with the help of a number of supporters, the United States would enter the scene and take control of the city of Tehran and by assassinating the imam and attacking such centers as those of the committee and Guards Corps, that they would end the rule of the revolution. Certainly this was the decision of the United States and there was no question of rescuing the hostages.

For the United States, the fall of the revolution was important, even if this military action were to face worldwide condemnation.

Another clue is that after the military attack on Tabas, the (Nuzheh) coup d'etat was uncovered. With the arrest of the elements of the coup, it became clear from what source it had been directed.

Hajj Pilgrimage and the Policy to Deal with the Actions of the Saudi Regime

It was asked of Mr Kho'iniha as the representative of the imam and the Iranian hajj pilgrims whether it is possible that the government of Saudi Arabia wants to create confrontation with the Iranian pilgrims and what preparations he had in mind in this regard.

In response, he said: In our opinion, with the experience of the past few years, both the government and the people of Saudi Arabia as well as the Muslim nations, especially those who come on pilgrimage, have noted that the people of Iran have committed no crime in carrying out political movements in the form of marches, gatherings and demonstrations, but have been carrying out a religious duty and by no means are the people trying to engage in conflicts with the Saudi Arabian regime with such actions. The purpose of these political actions is not opposition to the Saudi Arabian regime or interference in the internal affairs of Saudi Arabia; but it all involves the responsibility of the Muslim people of Saudi Arabia to have an opinion concerning their internal affairs.

In these few years, all the people of the world have seen that Iranians in all these gatherings and marches have had no slogans except those against the aggressions of Israel, against the aggressions of the Soviet Union on a Muslim country such as Afghanistan, and against the colonialist and inhumane policies of the United States throughout the world, especially the Islamic world. In all their movements, they have merely made an issue of the policies of the great Satanic powers against the oppressed people, especially the Muslim nations. Therefore, there is no reasonable, convincing reason for Saudi Arabia to oppose these sound political movements. The experiences of the past have also shown that the government of Saudi Arabia, like all other governments, no longer has the power to stand against the nations.

In any case, if in the future the government of Saudi Arabia intends to again follow a policy of conflict and confrontation with the people in these political movements, we shall engage in no other action except the enlightenment of public opinion, making the people of the world understand the nature of our movement and the meaning and content of the opposition of Saudi Arabia to this movement. We only consider it our duty to raise these political slogans of the Islamic world. We consider this the foreign policy of Islam, that is, the expression of innocence, the declaration of disgust with the infidels and heathens, and the declaration of the unity and brotherhood of the Muslim nations. We shall do this as the policy of Islam and as a religious duty and the government of Saudi Arabia shall gain

nothing but the hatred of nations by confronting and opposing this movement.

We hope that the government of Saudi Arabia learns from the past and realizes that we do not have evil intentions regarding the regime of Saudi Arabia and have no intention of interfering in the affairs of that country. For it to cooperate with the people in carrying out the ceremonies in the best possible manner, in our opinion, would be in the interest of both the nation of Saudi Arabia and the government of Saudi Arabia, that is, of course, if this regime wants to be an Islamic government relying on the people.

Elections, the Presence of the People and the Role of the Imam

Mr Kho'iniha was asked: What is your opinion on the elections and the future makeup of the Majlis?

He answered: In my opinion, one of the very great and interesting gains of the revolution is the elections which have taken place in the course of these few years in Iran, especially the elections for the second term of the Majlis. These elections--due to the freedom of the people to participate, whether by being candidates, nominating candidates, electing, or voting, in connection with the whole election process--were very successful and freedom existed in the best possible manner. In this term, in addition to the official and legal freedoms which were provided, all sorts of hidden obstacles for the people which might have prevented free and true elections (even if they were not unlawful actions) were removed with the leadership and instruction of the imam. For instance, it is not unlawful for a group which is trusted to nominate a candidate for the whole country. This is neither a crime nor is it essentially considered uncommon to political elections throughout the world. But the imam was not content to even have this much of an obstacle to the free elections of the people, because if a very respectable, legitimate group which is trusted by the society wants to nominate candidates from the capital of Tehran for some small city, it is possible that that act of introducing a candidate by that political-social group which is trusted might give credit to that candidate, resulting in others either not daring to become candidates or, if a person becomes a candidate, the people might feel that they should not vote for anyone except the candidates of that legitimate group.

Although not illegal, the imam all the same instructed that no candidate may be introduced by one area for another in order to ensure that every city and electoral zone would be completely free in the elections. For instance, a number of eligible clerics who are trusted by the society have gathered together to form the Tehran society of clerics and the society for combative

clerics and it would not be illegal for them to nominate candidates for other electoral zones. However, in order to prevent the Tehran society of clerics, for instance, from introducing candidates for another city, resulting in a candidate from that city not nominating himself lest he be considered in opposition to the clerics, or someone nominating himself, but the people not voting for him because they think that they must only vote for the candidates of the clerics, the imam removed such a hidden obstacle that could have prevented the free elections of the people.

In another speech, the imam said: First of all, everyone must vote for the candidate whom he is sure is competent. If he is not certain in his choice, since he does not know the candidate personally or those who have introduced the candidate, he must not be satisfied merely with the fact that a trusted group has nominated him. He should only act upon such nomination if he himself is sure. The imam even said something to the effect that if all the religious scholars and all respected personalities nominate an individual and you are not certain that he is competent, you are not religiously permitted to vote for him. To do so would be contrary to your religious duty. We see that the imam essentially removed these very hidden, invisible, and weakening obstacles to freedom with his statements on 11 February 1984 and in later speeches. Hence, we witnessed that in small electoral zones, sometimes as many as 11 persons were nominated.

Again, another indication of the elections having taken place in total freedom and the people having voted with precision, after some investigation and study, is that in some large electoral zones, you see that although a significant number of votes were dropped in the ballot boxes, not every candidate was able to get the necessary votes, which is a minimum of half plus one. Therefore, the elections have gone into the second phase in approximately half the electoral zones, which reveals perfectly well that the people did not vote with their eyes closed in a uniform manner for the names on a list endorsed by one group or another.

Everyone evaluated the candidates with complete care and precision in accordance with his own personal standards. If a person was satisfied in his heart, he voted for a particular candidate, otherwise, he did not. This demonstrates perfectly the freedom of elections. Another point is that considering the fever of election publicity, which was very high, as everyone witnessed, you see that conflicts over the ballot boxes and on election day itself were so few and insignificant as to be next to nothing. In other words, it is a percentage that can be found in any election.

He added: The widespread participation of the people in the elections was another proof that the people went to the ballot boxes quite willingly and with a sense of freedom. In some of the electoral zones, the number of participants in the elections was as large as the number of participants in the referendum for the Islamic Republic. In short, the elections were carried out freely, precisely and well. On the whole, I believe whenever there is a political movement at the level of the Majlis elections, freedom must be ensured if at all possible and if the people participate most actively, with awareness and intelligence, naturally, the Majlis will be a good one.

At the end of this interview, he added: Considering that during the elections of the first term of the Majlis, the counterrevolutionaries were active in connection with the elections, in order to prevent them from coming to the Majlis, the pro-revolutionary groups had to join in certain coalitions. Naturally, these coalitions result in compromises. However, this time, since the counterrevolutionaries did not have the power and visibility in the elections, the pro-revolutionary forces, which consisted of the decisive majority of the people, worked, publicized and were freely active in support of their candidates without fear of the counterrevolutionaries entering the scene and they carried out the elections well.

Of course, there have been some normal inadequacies which we do not consider essentially detrimental to the soundness of the elections as a whole. The elections in some of the electoral zones might even have been nullified due to, for example, the unsound atmosphere or for other reasons, and in certain places, some individuals were arrested for unlawful actions. But, on the whole, the elections went well. For this reason, we hope that the next Majlis will be a good one.

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CSO: 4640/212

IRAN

CHIEF JUSTICE ANALYZES NATURE, STRENGTH OF 'ISLAMIC RULE'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 24 Apr 84 pp 3, 15

[Text] Tabriz, ETTELA'AT correspondent:
Yesterday, Chief Justice Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili arrived in Tabriz to meet and speak with the religious scholars, clergy, and the authorities of Eastern Azarbaijan Province to study the judicial problems and difficulties of this Province and also to visit the units of the Justice Department and the Revolution Prosecutor's Office of that city. He was welcomed by Ayatollah Malakuti, the representative of the imam in Azarbaijan and Friday imam of Tabriz, the deputies of the Office of the Governor General of Eastern Azarbaijan, and a number of scholars and clerics.

According to a report by our ETTELA'AT correspondent, after his arrival in Tabriz, Chief Justice Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili attended the assembly of the Friday imams of Azarbaijan and the combative clerics of the region who had gathered at the home of Ayatollah Malakuti, the representative of the imam in Azarbaijan, and made important statements in connection with the recent elections and other issues.

He said: The recent elections throughout the country taught us a lesson and we must learn this lesson well and make use of it. The lesson that we learned from the election was that the people are behind the revolution.

He said: Sometimes we sit and talk. We might think about what we have really accomplished in these five years, what positive and negative results our actions have had, whether there have been more positive or negative results, lest the people become upset or bothered and become disappointed in the revolution. Some say that this or that is said in the lines, taxis and buses, but the elections proved very well that the people still value

the revolution as they do the pupils of their eyes and this is something for which to be very thankful.

He added: We feel very secure; we can learn this lesson from the Friday prayers, the aides to the fronts and from one of the manifestations and very important aspects, which is the elections.

The chief justice said: Meanwhile, the elections made us realize that the people are watching us very attentively and this is very good. We realized that we are facing a very alert people who do not just accept whatever someone or other has said. Of course, it is possible for the people to make errors in their judgment. Do we not commit errors? Any magistrate can make a mistake in his judgment. In their social affairs, people pray in support of us and at the same time watch us carefully.

Continuing his statements, he referred to the presence of the combative clerics at the various levels of the society and pointed out that our managing affairs well will be proof of our competence and awareness and our acting badly would prove precisely the reverse. We must have God in mind and keep the people content and not cause them discontent. The people must be content with us from the bottom of their hearts and must be fond of us. We cannot rely on the sword, because our organization is not that of the Pahlavis or Yazid. We want to implement the justice of 'Ali and this is not possible through fear and terror.

He added: Oh God, I ask you, by the pure blood of the martyrs, to protect this beloved imam from all harm. His decree this year concerning the elections brought prestige to the elections throughout the world and secured the freedom of elections.

He added: Let us follow a path together and if we have committed any mistakes thus far, let us not repeat them, and if we have not committed any mistakes and we have worked well, let us work even better. By God, the same difference between the past elections and these elections will be the difference between these elections and future elections. You know, it is not important to be elected in the elections. A person is either voted for or not voted for. In this revolution, we are prepared to accept any responsibility, including sweeping the yards of those higher up. But what is important is that we review our behavior in the course of these four years and eliminate our imperfections.

In continuing his statements, Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili, referring to the judicial issues of the country, said: The reaction of the two Provinces of Khorasan and Tabriz in connection with judicial affairs has been good and I thank the responsible brothers in these two Provinces. You know that the government of Islam is a judicial government and a magistrate is

in charge of everything in Islam. Adjudication was born with Islam. As long as there is Islam, there shall be adjudication.

He added: Of course, given that some of our magistrates are young and inexperienced, in certain cases, they might not carry out the procedures of a case correctly. In these elections, there were complaints that in some places throughout Iran, in three or four places, some of the magistrates had not been totally neutral and had, for instance, signed the communique of a candidate. Of course, time is required to resolve these problems. I think that in regards to adjudication and the necessary resources, there are fewer needs in Tabriz; but other cities of Azarbaijan need magistrates.

He said: The situation of our prisons is not very good in terms of cases not being investigated or investigated late and such issues. But, we hope that by the spring of 1986, many of the shortcomings will be eliminated with the graduation of students from Qom and other colleges.

In conclusion, referring to the conspiracies of foreign and domestic enemies, he said: Today, the superpowers play games or engage in certain actions with the cooperation of the reactionary sheiks of the Persian Gulf. Hence, we must prepare ourselves for every situation to be prepared for anything and to take care of the people's needs in this connection. We cannot say that we rely on prisons and the sword. This is not worthy of the Islamic government.

It should be pointed out that at the beginning of the session, Ayatollah Malakuti welcomed Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili on behalf of the people of Azarbaijan, the Friday imams, the combative clerics of the regime and the revolutionary institutions and, referring to the victory of the Islamic revolution which was achieved with the pure blood of many martyrs, he pointed out the necessity for efforts to perpetuate the Islamic revolution and increase the attention of the authorities to this region.

Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili also took part in a television interview and responded to the questions of the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT in Tabriz.

In this interview,, referring to the work and activities of the Supreme Court in the past year, the chief justice said: In the course of the period 21 March 1983-20 March 1984, in addition to devising the program of the Supreme Court and investigating 20,000 cases, it has also investigated 11,000 existing cases, which is unprecedented or rare in the history of the Supreme Court.

Referring to the success of the judicial organization of the Province of Eastern Azarbaijan, Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili also praised the help and the cooperation of the religious scholars and the clerics of this Province and added: The problems in this Province have been resolved and we do not have any major problems.

In continuing this interview, the chief justice thanked the expansive participation of the Hezbollah nation in the elections of the second term of Majlis and said: The people with their expansive participation in these elections gave a strong response to those who are sitting abroad and talking.

Then, referring to the freedom of the elections, he said: Such elections are unmatched in the world in terms of being free and not having the slightest interference of the officials and authorities.

In the conclusion of this interview, the chief justice expressed hope that the people will also participate actively in the mid-term elections as in the past and prove the growth in their awareness.

According to our correspondent in Tabriz, Chief Justice Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili participated in the morning formations of the joint armed forces of the Islamic Republic in the Tabriz barracks and in a speech, he said: We thank God Almighty from the first days of the victory of the Islamic revolution that today we are in a better situation than we were yesterday and, God willing, tomorrow will prove better than today. He added: During this period, you have made an effort to serve, and with your sincerity and the martyrs and self-sacrificers that you have offered, you have brought glory, greatness and victory. Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili added: Members of the armed forces, the revolution is sitting in expectation of you. The enemies of Islam have grown tired of conspiracy but they have not stopped yet. They have realized your greatness. Although once they allowed themselves to frighten you, today, they are afraid of you, and tomorrow they will run away from you. You have accomplished a task which has stabilized the revolution and exported it. Once, the superpowers of the world would not accept us as servants; now they are prepared to kiss your hands and bow to you. But beware: this action of theirs and their seeking peace is a trick and a fraud. They want to harm you, us, the revolution and the revolutionary forces. They still allow themselves to come to our coastal waters and claim ownership. The United States allows itself to watch the Persian Gulf from a distance. They try to frighten us with chemical bombs and complex weapons. But our armed forces have proven frequently that none of these weapons work against the weapon of faith. They still dare to claim mastery in a sea and a gulf which by any legal, judicial and international

calculation we must protect. But those days are gone. They should get lost and clear their minds of such ideas. During the time of the tyrant, we were but miserable captives. Our voices were low and we stretched out a hand in need towards them. But today we are under the banner of Islam; we seek help from God. The support for our combatants is not the complex weapons of the superpowers; our weapon is our faith. The faces of France, Europe, the United States, Israel, the East and the superpowers must be rubbed into the ground so that they will no longer think about economic, political and military aggression.

In conclusion, it must be pointed out: With the glory that God has granted us, we have been successful in the imposed war thus far and, God willing, we will be successful to the end. The day is not too far away; the superpowers cannot overcome us and our faith, because history has proven this, unless, God forbid, we get tired. That would be the day our death would arrive and, God willing, that day will never come.

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CSO: 4640/213

'INQUISITION' REPORTEDLY IMPLEMENTED IN UNIVERSITIES

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Apr 84 p 6

[Article by J. M. Durand-Souffland]

[Text] After a long shutdown, the Iranian universities have reopened their doors. But to gain access is not an easy matter, judging from the questionnaire, twenty-three categories long--worthy of the inquisition--to which every applicant is subjected on registration.

Of course, the interrogatory begins with the past history of the applicant, in conformity with the traditions of the extremely vigilant political police. As a matter of fact, it will be incumbent on the applicant to list "all the ties" which he could possibly have established with the movements, parties and organs of the preceding regime, by specifying the dates of these "ties," the activities which he engaged in inside these groups, the manner in which he was induced to consort to them and the motives for which he selected them.

Then, the applicant is asked whether the persons in his family environment had any ties with the parties and the "political, ideological or professional movements." This item concerns the father, mother, brother(s), sister(s) and wives or husbands. After that, an excerpt from police records concerning not only the applicant, but even each member of his family, as indexed above, must be attached to the dossier.

After the family the questionnaire inquires about friends. "Who are your friends?" it asks. The friends must be classified in three categories: the friends who are students "in the same discipline," students in other special fields and friends "on the outside." Their respective name, address and profession must be spelled out.

Then the questionnaire goes back to the family to inquire whether the latter has any members in the armed services, or in the official revolutionary organizations. The next question bears on the possible role played by the applicant "at the time of the last university elections." "Was he a candidate for office? For whom did he vote and why?" Question 16 deals with the factions engaged in "armed combat against the Islamic Republic." "Who profits from their activity, what attitude should the Republic take toward them?"

In Case of Willful Misstatement

Formerly, one had to recall exactly all the trips taken abroad by the applicant and the members of his family, indicating dates, length of stay outside Iran and the reasons for these moves. Likewise, if the applicant has relatives living abroad, he must state their name, exact address, profession, etc.

Apparently, much importance is also attached to the "intellectual" status of the applicant: after having declared that he did or did not participate in some activity against the former regime he will confess his potential connections with a library--which one?--an intellectual or religious circle. He must state whether he attends a Mosque--which one?--or a cafeteria. Did he take part in any manifestations, scrawl any graffiti on the walls, distribute any political tracts, or attend any reunions of a student council? Finally, the inquiry is interested in the "favorite hobbies of the applicant," his opinion regarding the purging of the University, his opinion on the "future of the Islamic Republic," and lastly, an exhaustive list of the applicant's former addresses, the exact length of residence, and the reasons for departure. The most unreasonable requirement on the questionnaire requires him to attach to his dossier a diagram of his present lodging. A note at the end reminds him that "every incorrect answer to the questionnaire will entail official punitive steps." One is certainly justified in shuddering at the thought of what may happen to absent-minded individuals or persons making willful misstatements.

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CSO: 4619/41

ZIA VIEWED OPTIMISTICALLY AS CIVILIAN PRESIDENT

Rawalpindi HURMAT in Urdu 5 Apr 84 pp 7-9

[Article by Zahid Malak: "Will General Zia be Appointed Civilian President? Will the Majority of Politicians Accept Nonparty Elections for the 'Transitional Period?' President Will Be a Different Person After Being Elected; A National Security Council Will Help the Elected Government as a Watchdog"]

[Text] After 7 years of careful planning, the removal of opposition and deliberations, President Zia has compiled a detailed plan for establishing an Islamic government. Some opposition leaders call this President Zia's scheme to extend his grip on the country. In any event, the president has detailed his plans for a new government in his historic speech at Peshawar. Any student of Pakistani politics interested in the shape of things to come should study this nine-point declaration of the president.

We should clarify two important points in the beginning. First, President Zia is an expert administrator (he was known as a brilliant tactical planner in the army). He listens more and talks less and is a deep thinker. He is sometimes late in making decisions but is never accused of making hasty decisions. He keeps his plans secret and when implementing a plan, he first creates a receptive environment. Some examples of his planning skills: postponement of the 1977 and 1979 elections, government's cooperation and later breakup with the PNA [Pakistan National Alliance], municipal elections, the ban on political parties and student organizations and the recent reorganizations in the army and the cabinet.

Second, the president has formed a strategy to get rid of the irresponsible and fanatic leadership in the country. He is trying to establish a leadership at the national level that is similar to the municipal leadership that agrees with the army. President Zia's strategy not only considers the internal unrest in the country but also focuses on the grave problems on our borders. Military leadership views each problem, including politics, from the standpoint of national security. The danger of an Indian attack and, more than that, the arrival of the Soviet Army at Torkham is a matter of grave concern to the army. The army cannot afford to leave the country in the hands of irresponsible leaders; it can, however, cooperate with a leadership that is willing to work with it.

These two factors have forced the government into holding nonparty elections. We can say that the government has finally decided to hold elections on a nonparty basis. This decision allows some established politicians to run for election; if politicians at all levels were banned from participating in these elections, they could cause problems. Having only well-known politicians will give these elections some credibility. The government is thus taking a middle way and allowing some prominent politicians to run for election. These prominent politicians, while running as independent candidates, will not be able to take any action against other people participating in the elections because of their vested interests. This strategy worked well during the municipal elections. There are two benefits of this strategy: influential politicians, upon being successful in the elections, will cooperate with the government, thus making the government strong, and by leaving their party, they will make that party even weaker.

To make the coming elections credible and win the cooperation of various groups, the president has promised representation to all kinds of professional and occupational groups in the national and provincial assemblies. Several labor, farm and intellectual representatives will be appointed to the elected assemblies. Since these elections will be held on a nonparty basis, the question of balanced representation does not arise.

Now the question arises: Where and from whom will this nine-point "Peshawar Declaration" of our president get support? The president's answer is, "The common man is not interested in elections." President Zia, in an interview in the prominent newspaper WAFAAQ, said that a large amount of foreign currency is being circulated in our country to create unrest. The common man, according to the president, desires stability and not elections. Critics, however, do not agree with the president. They believe that the common man wants elections along with stability and that is why they are willing to accept elections on a nonparty basis as a starting point since they are hoping for a Western-style democracy, which they consider appropriate. The people understand that the transfer from military dictatorship to civilian rule will require several phases. It will go through "limited democracy," "basic democracy" or what the present government likes to call "Islamic democracy." A leader of a defunct party told me that they want elections regardless of the type. He added that any leader in our party whose chance to win is even as low as 55 percent will run in these elections; it does not matter what other parties say about these elections (this politician is also running for election).

The president is disregarding this minor opposition to his plans for holding elections because he is aware that the number of people who dislike these politicians is greater than people who do not agree with his plans. His analysis shows that people are unhappy with the politicians because of their past deeds. If elections are held on a party basis and a single party comes to power, the resulting government will last only a few months or a year and a half at most. Perhaps this conclusion of the government is wishful thinking. It is a fact, however, that people are not happy with the past or present deeds of most of the politicians. In this respect, these politicians say that the "secret hand" does not let them unite.

In light of this all, we can say that President Zia will be able to successfully hold elections by March 1985 according to his plans and establish a national and four provincial assemblies. While the government will be happy that it has succeeded in encouraging wholesome leadership that is "appointed by God," the politicians will be satisfied by calling these elections necessary for the "transitional" period.

The people who believe that these elections will help transfer power from the army to a civilian government are living in a fool's paradise. The real power will remain with the army. The army thus will succeed in having General Zia elected as president according to the 1973 constitution and will establish a national security council, which will act as a watch dog to help the president and his government. The membership of this council will include the chairman of the committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and heads of the three branches of the armed forces. The appointments of General Rahimuddin as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Gen K.M. Arif as army vice chief of staff of the National Security Council have been made keeping in mind the importance of the National Security Council. These two men are considered the closest allies and confidants of President Zia. Thus, if President Zia decides to relinquish his uniform a few days before or after being elected, his position would have been strengthened because (1) the main source of his power, the army, still will be behind him and (2) being an elected head of state, his prestige will increase in other countries, especially in the West. He will be in a better position to negotiate with other countries, including India. After all, an elected president has his own distinctive style.

We can confidently say that if President Zia is elected as a civilian president for the next 5 years, he will make some fundamental changes. He is aware that some elements in the bureaucracy are acting on their own whims and that the police have failed to stop crime. He is also aware that there are some elements in Pakistan that are busy causing misunderstandings between provinces, increasing unrest by raising slogans and thus weakening the country. Such people are helped by others. In summary, there are several issues that he would like to deal with but is unable to because of the limitations imposed by his present role. He is well aware that because of these limitations he is criticized by people for his lack of action. This entire situation will change when he is elected as a civilian president.

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